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The legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its
impetuous vortex. ̂
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution vests the "[J]udicial Power" of the
United States in the Supreme Court and in any inferior courts
that Congress estahlishes,^ hoth Congress^ and the Courf* have
long propounded the traditional view that the inferior courts may
he deprived cognizance of some of the cases and controversies that
fall within that power.̂  Is this view fully consonant with the
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 279 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
2 U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § l.
3 See, e.g.. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73-82 (establishing inferior federal
courts and then limiting their jurisdiction to a subset of the cases and controversies
identified in Article III); see also Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power
to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46 n.4 (1975) (citing and collecting various other examples of
congressional enactments limiting the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts). For a more
recent and controversial instance of congressional jurisdiction-stripping, see the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2623 (2006) (amended 2009):
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any
claim or cause of action whatsoever, including any action pending on or
filed after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of
2006, relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military
commission under this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of
procedures of militfiry commissions under this chapter.
< See, e.g.. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) ("[T]he power
which congress possess [sic] to create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily implies the
power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular objects . . . ."); Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) ("[Congress] was not constitutionally required to create
inferior Art. Ill courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United
States . . . . Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with
all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III.").
5 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569,
1569 (1990) ("[T]he traditional view of article III [is] that Congress has plenary authority
over federal court jurisdiction. According to that view. Congress may deprive the lower
federal courts, the Supreme Court, or all federal courts of jurisdiction over any cases within
the federal judicial power, excepting only those few that fall within the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction."). Current statutes reflective of this traditional view are too numerous
to mention here, but one of the most familiar is the federal diversity jurisdiction statute.
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history and text of Article III? One possible reading of those
sources suggests that the Constitution vests the full Judicial
Power of the United States in the inferior federal courts, directly
extending to them jurisdiction over matters that Congress may not
abridge. This position is controversial and has been rejected.^
However, my goal here is to explore whether the text, structure,
and history of Article III provide any support for this contention.
: When one consults the record of debates surrounding the
drafting and adoption of the Constitution and analyzes the
constitutional text in light of insights gained from those debates, it
seems that the "plan of the Convention'"' was to create an
independent and equal branch of government fully capable of
exercising the Judicial Power of the United States free from the
control of the other branches and empowered to give greater effect
to the superior authority of the central government and its laws
than had been the case under the Articles of Confederation.
Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution expressly considered and
rejected language that would have undermined that central plan
by investing Congress with the very authority over the Federal
Judiciary that Congress and the Court have presumed to exist.
Thus, although our system envisions certain checks and balances
aniong the three branches of government, conceding congressional
authority to manipulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts is
in some tension with notions of judicial independence the Framers
seemingly embraced and pursued.^
I
I
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) Qimiting federal courts to cognizance of diversity cases
involving disputes where more than $75,000 is in controversy).
I" See, e.g.. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.l (1799) (footnote by Chase,
J.) ("The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal Courts derive their
judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal
of the judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress."); see also
Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 ViLL. L.
REV. 1030, 1031 (1982) ('The position that the Constitution obligates Congress to create
lower federal courts, or (having created them) to vest them with some or all of the
jurisdiction authorized by article III, has been repudiated by an unbroken line of
authoritative judicial and legislative precedent.").
' See infra Part II (denning and exploring the concept).
8 These questions are not merely academic but are of the greatest import. For example,
the importance of the jurisdictional issue derives, in part, from the fact that Congress has
frequently used jurisdiction-stripping to register its disagreement with and to control how
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There have been only a few challenges to the received wisdom
blessing congressional control over inferior court jurisdiction,^
even though there is a long tradition of scholarship—penned by
the likes of Justice Joseph Story and Professor Henry Hart—that
the federal courts exercise the Judicial Power. See RICHARD H. FALLÓN, JR. ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS A â) THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 321 (5th ed. 2003)
("[P]erhaps the most controversial proposals to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts
have been those that reflect a substantive disagreement with the way the Supreme Court,
the lower federal courts, or both have resolved particular issues.").
9 Professor Robert N. Clinton, in A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984),
offers a historical analysis of the question similar to that presented in this Article, although
with different areas of emphasis and differing conclusions. See id. at 746-48 ("This Article
will examine the history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the judicial article in
order to discern any original intention of the framers that might be relevant to current
debates over the source and scope of congressional power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); id, at 749-50 ('The conclusion of this inquiry
is that the framerSj by providing that '(t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may fi-om time to
time ordain and establish,' intended to mandate that Congress allocate to the federal
judiciary as a whole each and every type of case or controversy defined as part of the
judicial power of the United S ta tes . . . . " (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting
U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § l)); see also Gerald Günther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 913
(1984) ('There have been very few academics who have suggested that there are substantial
internal restraints :. . on congressional authority over lower federal courts."); Caprice L.
Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three String Serenade, 51 ViLL. L.
REV. 593, 622-25, 630-31 (2006) (relating a fictitious dialogue in which a Supreme Court
Justice expresses concerns about the constitutional propriety of jurisdiction-stripping
legislation); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 21-22, 67
(1981) (arguing that although Congress has the authority to restrict the Article III
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, this authority must be exercised within constitutional
limitations and be subject to full judicial review). Although in one of his writings Professor
Charles Warren did well to acknowledge that "the strong pro-Constitution men" who "took
the position that Congress had no power to withhold from the Federal Courts which it
should establish any of the judicial power granted by the Constitution" were probably in the
right, he did not further endorse or advocate for the position and indeed indicated that its
failure to hold sway "was extremely fortunate for the United States." Charles Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 67-69 (1923).
Scholars likely have eschewed a direct challenge to the traditional view because the
Supreme Court early on affirmed without reservation that Congress has the power to limit
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to a subset of the Judicial Power set forth in
Article III. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.. . . Such has
been the doctrine held by this court since its first establishment.").
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lias otherwise thoroughly analyzed the nature of Congress's
authority with respect to the Federal Judiciary. i° This Article
does not take up that challenge so much as it attempts to revive
the debate.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the debates in
the Federal Constitutional Convention and those of the various
state ratifying conventions to discover the original understanding
of the nature and scope of the Judicial Power. These discussions,
as well as the proposal and amendment process of the Framers
during the Federal Convention, will be combined with the
perspective offered in The Federalist to arrive at a general
understanding of the plan of the Convention with respect to the
Judicial Power and the Federal Judiciary. Part III details the
traditional view that Congress has the authority to limit the
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts. Part IV offers a possible
alternative to this traditional view, questioning Congress's
authority to pare down the Judicial Power to be exercised by
inferior Article III courts—the constitutional vesting thesis—and
concludes with a discussion of some implications of this idea.
'° The debate over the nature of Congress's authority with respect to the inferior federal
courts has been long and robust. Justice Story long ago set forth his vision that the "shall"
language in Article Ill's Vesting Clause meant that the entire Federal Judicial Power must
be vested in some federal court; thus, to the extent that Congress deprives the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction over matters falling within the Judicial Power, Congress is obligated to
create inferior federal courts invested with cognizance of those matters. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816) ("[C]ongress are bound to create some inferior
courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively
vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original
cognizance."). Hart moved the debate forward by affirming the traditional view that
Congress has plenary authority over federal court jurisdiction, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
H^V. L. REV, 1362, 1363-64 (1953) ("Congress seems to have plenary power to limit federal
jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a
state court."), but did so with the caveat that Congress may make such exceptions to the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction "such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court
in; the constitutional plan." Id. at 1365.
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II. THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION
Any exploration of the meaning and import of the Article III
Judicial Power must begin with a review of the evidence from the
deliberations from the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787
and the subsequent state ratifjdng conventions. Here, one finds
the organic development of the language of Article III from its
initial proposal through final approval and the accompanying
sentiments, rationales, and understandings of those called to
shape or to approve the resulting text. The organic development of
Article Ill's language is significant because it reveals language and
provisions considered and rejected, giving us insight into what the
Framers intended the Article to accomplish and what powers they
explicitly did not approve.
The evidence of drafting revisions and the accompanying debate
of the Convention delegates, coupled with the debates of the
delegates to the state conventions, reveal what has been termed
the "plan of the Convention."^! fhe plan of the Convention as it
pertains to the Judicial Power interests scholars here. What was
the Framers' intent with respect to the assignment of the Judicial
Power to various elements within the federal government? What
relationship was envisioned for Congress and the Judiciary? How
did the Framers understand that the new Constitution would
protect judicial independence? What role did separation of powers
doctrine play in this regard and what steps did the Framers take
to further the doctrine? Below, this Article will discuss early
materials pertaining to the drafting and consideration of the
Constitution with an eye toward answering some of these
questions.
" See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 479-80 ("The
plan of the convention, in the first place, authorizes the national legislature 'to constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.' It declares, in the next place, that 'the Judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as Congress shall. . . ordain and establish.' " (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
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À. THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
I The debates on the Constitution reveal the evolution of the
Judiciary Article in the direction of less congressional control and
expanded judicial authority. The starting point for debate in the
Federal Convention was a set of proposed resolutions offered by
Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The ninth of these concerned the
Jfudiciary for the new government and read as follows:
; Res[olved] that a National Judiciary be established to
consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of
inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National
I Legislature, to hold their offices during good
behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times
I fixed compensation for their services, in which no
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the
persons actually in office at the time of such increase
' or diminution. [T]hat the jurisdiction of the inferior
¡ tribunals shall be to hear [and] determine in the first
¡ instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and
determine in the [last] resort, all piracies [and] felonies
on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect
! the collection of the National revenue; impeachments
of any National officers, and questions which may
I involve the national peace and harmony. 12
Several aspects of this draft are noteworthy. First, the resolution
vests the Legislature with authority to designate inferior
tribunals. Second, in this draft we find a direct vesting of
jurisdiction in the "inferior tribunals" as evidenced by the
la.nguage "the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be."
12 1 JAMES MADISON, Session of Tuesday, May 29, 1787, in THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION WHICH OF 1787 FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 21, 25 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987) [hereinafter DEBATES IN
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
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Third, the "supreme tribunal" enjoys only appellate jurisdiction. ̂ ^
Finally, the draft defines the jurisdiction of the federal courts
vaguely as embracing "questions which may involve the national
peace and harmony." Most relevant to our discussion are the first
two.
The authority to "choose" inferior tribunals is the extent of the
role that the text gives the National Legislature; it specifies none
other. Then, the draft directly vests in the inferior federal courts
jurisdiction over a specified class of cases: the proposed text states
that "the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear [and]
determine in the first instance" certain specified cases and
controversies.I"* These two aspects of the proposed language leave
little room for the notion that the legislature has the authority to
curtail inferior court jurisdiction, or at least this particular
provision would not have served as a basis for presuming such
authority. The questions are what became of this language and
whether the proposal was revised in any way that enlarged or
permitted legislative authority in such a direction.
After a summer of debate, on August 6, 1787 the Convention's
Committee of Detail prepared and presented a draft of the
Constitution to the Convention delegates. This draft spoke of the
power of the federal courts in what was then Article XI as follows:
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to
time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United
States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of
the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good
behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for
their services, a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.
13 See id. ("[T]hat the jurisdiction . . . of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in
the [last] resort ").
14 Id.
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; Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting
! Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to
the trial of impeachments of officers of the United
i States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more
i States, (except such as shall regard Territory or
I Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another
State, between Citizens of different States, and
i between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign
I States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment,
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers
! and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party,
' this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other
cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such
i exceptions and under such regulations as the
i Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign
any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except
the trial of the President of the United States) in the
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to
By this point, the drafters had made a raft of substantial
alterations. A distinction between the "Judicial Power of the
United States" and the "Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" had
arisen, with the latter confined to a more specifically delineated
list of cases and controversies than found in the initial proposal.
Interestingly, the draft conferred this jurisdiction directly upon
the Supreme Court with "the Legislature" possessing the power to
"assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned . . . in the
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to
such Inferior Courts." Here, there was an explicit vesting in the
Legislature of the authority to take the jurisdiction of the Supreme
1* Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 12, at 337, 344.
10 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
Court and distribute some subset ofthat jurisdiction to the inferior
federal courts as it sees fit. With this language that authority
would be plenary and unquestionable.
In late August of 1787, the Convention delegates took up
consideration of Article XI dealing with the Judiciary. On August
27, 1787, James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved for—and
the Convention approved—a change in the language of section 3 of
that article by striking "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court" and
replacing it with "the Judicial power.''̂ ^ The effect of this change
was substantial. No longer did the first clause of section 3 refer
only to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; rather, the
enumerated cases were now proper to the full scope of "the
Judicial power," which—per section 1—̂ was vested both in the
Supreme Court "and in" any inferior courts created by Congress.
Although the revision vested the inferior federal courts with a
Judicial Power that extended to the enumerated cases and
controversies of section 3, the final clause of that section still
authorized Congress to "assign any part of the jurisdiction
abovementioned. . . under the limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts." Thus, this language would have
given Congress the authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts to some subset of what the larger Judicial
Power might comprehend. Of course, vesting Congress with such
authority would have been in tension with the vesting of the
Judicial Power in the inferior federal courts. If Congress could
determine which part of that power the lower courts could
exercise, then it would nowise be true that those inferior courts
fully possessed the "Judicial Power of the United States." In what
might have been an effort to resolve that tension, the Convention
unanimously approved a motion to strike the entire last sentence
in section 3 beginning with "The Legislature may assign . . . ."̂ '̂
This change indeed was the most dramatic and the most critical to
our discussion. The draft no longer vested the Legislature with
plenary authority to determine what portion of the federal
16 Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 12, at 471, 475.
" Id. at 476.
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jurisdiction the inferior federal courts would enjoy; rather, the
revised text stripped the Legislature of such power and placed
those inferior federal courts on equal footing with the Supreme
Court with respect to possessing the Judicial Power, save where
the provision reserved matters to the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.
' As they were trimming back congressional authority to limit the
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, the delegates to the
Convention also rebuffed an effort to extend to Congress additional
I)ower over the Judiciary. When a motion was made to insert at
the end of section 3, "In all the other cases before mentioned the
Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the
Legislature shall direct," the Convention delegates rejected the
motion by a vote of 6-to-2.i8 Although discussion of this item does
not appear in Madison's notes of the debates, one can imagine that
delegates deemed the proposed insertion to be at odds with the
ihajority's sentiment that Congress had no business interfering
with the Federal Judiciary's exercise of the Judicial Power.
Indeed, the combination of extending the Judicial Power to the
inferior federal courts, the shearing of congressional authority to
"assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned," and the
rejection of the idea that Congress should be able to "direct" the
"manner" in which "the Judicial power shall be exercised" stands
as a clear victory for judicial independence and a repudiation of
the idea that the Judicial Branch should be subordinate to
Congress rather than its co-equal sibling.
' The only accession to congressional authority over judicial
liiatters left intact after these amendments—^besides authority in
section 1 to constitute inferior federal tribunals—^was the
authority in section 3 to make "exceptions" and "regulations"
governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On
August 28, 1787, the Convention approved a motion to strike the
words "it shall be appellate" and to insert the words "the supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction," in section 3 of Article XI. î
'18 Id. at 475-76.
}^ Session of Tuesday, August 28, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 12, at 476, 476.
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The rationale reported in Madison's notes was "to prevent
uncertainty whether 'it' referred to the supreme Court, or to the
Judicial power."^^ Thus, it was clear that the Judicial Power was
not to be limited to appellate review and that Congress's power to
make "exceptions" and "regulations" applied not to the exercise of
the Judicial Power but only to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.^i
A final detail worth noting is that the Convention delegates
rejected a motion by Madison and James McHenry to reinsert the
words "increased or" before the word "diminished" in section 2.̂ 2
Had this change been made. Congress would have been
constitutionally prevented from increasing judicial pay for existing
federal judges. The delegates felt that increases would be
necessary to counter the effects of infiation and to compensate
judges properly for the inevitable increase in judicial business they
would have to manage as the country aged.̂ s Although Madison
2° Id.
2' Collecting these amendments together, section 3 would have then read as follows:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by
the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers
of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to
controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard
Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens
thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment,
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases beforementioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions and under such regulations as
the Legislature shall make.
See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (presenting draft of then Article XI and
discussing subsequent revisions).
22 S e s s i o n of M o n d a y , A u g u s t 2 7 , 1 7 8 7 , in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 12, at 271, 274. The initial proposal to the Convention had prohibited the
"increase or diminution" of judicial compensation. Session of Tuesday, May 29, 1787, in 1
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 21, 25.
23 See Session of Wednesday, July 18, 1787 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris), in 2
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 274, 278 ("The value of money
may not only alter but the State of Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of
wheat, the same value would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must
always be regulated by the manners [and] the style of living in a Country. The increase of
business can not, be provided for in the supreme tribunal [by increasing the number of
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suggested that the power to increase would be a slight weight
against judicial independence in the event the judges became
overly desirous of a raise, the Convention seemed to disagree, or at
least to place more value on the need to attract the best talent to
the federal bench.̂ -*
The draft that the Committee on Style presented to the
Convention for final consideration contained a judiciary article
that closely tracked the language ultimately adopted as Article III
of the U.S. Constitution, with the enumeration of cases and
controversies falling within the Judicial Power moving to Section 2
of the Article.25
judges]. All the business of a certain description whether more or less must be done in that
single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for additional business.
Additional compensation therefore ought not to be prohibited.").
'•^ See Session of Monday, August 27, 1787 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinkney), in 2
DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 471, 474 ('The importance of the
Judiciary will require men of the first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary,
larger than the U.S. can allow in the first instance." (footnote omitted)).
25 Session of Wednesday, September 12, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 545, 551-52:
Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity,
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of
the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office.
Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law and
equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. To all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to which the United
States shall be a party. To controversies between two or more States;
between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens or subjects.
In cases affecting ambassadors, other, public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have
14 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
B. THE DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS
The proceedings of the state ratifsdng conventions are useful for
gaining some insight into the meaning ascribed to the words of the
Constitution by people of the day.̂ e A central concern among state
convention delegates was the scope of the jurisdiction given to the
federal courts by Article III. The Massachusetts Convention
addressed these concerns by ratifying the Constitution but
recommending several amendments. Relevant to our discussion is
the seventh proposal:
Seventhly. The Supreme Judicial Federal Court
shall have no jurisdiction of causes between citizens of
different states, unless the matter in dispute, whether
it concern the realty or personalty, be of the value of
three thousand dollars at the least; nor shall the
federal judicial powers extend to any action between
citizens of different states, where the matter in
dispute, whether it concern the realty or personalty, is
been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall
be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.
26 For a discussion of the various originalist approaches of looking to the drafters versus
the ratifiers of the Constitution for insight into its original meaning, see Thomas B. Colby &
Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 249-50 (2009):
Even in the early days of "original intent" originalism, there was internal
disagreement about the proper focus of the inquiry. The "intent of the
Framers" was a misleading abstraction that implied a degree of agreement
that was not really there. Just who were the "Framers" whose intentions
mattered: the men who drafted the text of the Constitution and agreed
upon it at the Philadelphia convention, or the men whose ratification votes
at the subsequent state conventions gave it the force of law? The early
originalists could not agree on the answer to that question.
For another useful discussion of originatism as an approach to constitutional interpretation,
see Richard H. Fallón, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They
Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. & POL'Y 5, 5 (2011) ("Although it is
customary to speak of originalism as a single constitutional theory, even a cursory review of
recent scholarship reveals that the range of originalist theories has grown startlingly broad
and diverse and is becoming more so all the time. So great are the differences among
originaUst theories that I question the premise that we can talk meaningfully about
Originalism . . . . " ) .
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' not of the value of fifteen hundred dollars at the
' least.27
¡ What does this tell us about the understanding that
Massachusetts Convention delegates had of the Constitution?
Well, if these delegates felt there was a need to amend the
Constitution to limit the Federal Judicial Power to diversity
actions valued at $1,500 or more, that may indicate they believed
that the Constitution as presented to them permitted inferior
courts to exercise jurisdiction in actions of any dollar arnount.^s It
is instructive, then, that the delegates offered an amendment of
this kind; it may be that the Massachusetts delegates had some
sense that unless the Framers adopted this type of amendment,
the federal courts would hear diversity cases in which less than
$1,500 was in dispute. If the Massachusetts delegates had an
understanding that the description of the Judicial Power in
Article III did not vest such jurisdiction in the inferior federal
courts and that Congress itself could limit the cognizance of the
federal courts in the manner that the Massachusetts amendment
proposed, one can at least doubt whether the Massachusetts
delegates would have felt compelled to propose such a specific
amendment. The Convention of Maryland reached like
conclusions and proposed amending language to attach an amount
in controversy to the jurisdiction of the inferior federal
' " Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 5, 1788),
reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION l, 177 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
1891) [hereinafter ELUOT'S DEBATES].
|28 Admittedly, it could also mean that Massachusetts delegates were concerned that
Congress would not impose any limitations on inferior federal court jurisdiction.
29 The amendment proposed by the Maryland delegates read as follows:
That the inferior federal courts shall not have jurisdiction of less than
dollars; and there may be an appeal, in all cases of revenue, as well
' to matter of fact as law; and Congress may give the state courts jurisdiction
of revenue cases, for such forms, and in such manner, as they may think
proper.
A| Fragment of Facts, Disclosing the Conduct of the Maryland Convention (Apr. 24, 1788),
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 547, 550 (blank space appears in the
original). Explaining the amendment, the Convention wrote, that one of "[t]he great objects
of these amendments [was] . . . [t]o give a concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, in
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Similar efforts to amend the text of Article III arose out of the
New York Convention. Delegates there proposed a slew of
amendments that would curtail the scope of the Judicial Power.
For example, the first amendment offered to Article III read as
follows: ,
Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that
nothing in the Constitution now under consideration
contained shall be construed so as to authorize the
Congress to constitute, ordain, or establish, any
tribunals, or inferior courts, with any other than
appellate jurisdiction, except such as may be necessary
for trial of causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and for the trial of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas; and in all other cases to
which the judicial power of the United States extends,
and in which the Supreme Court of the United States
has no original jurisdiction, the cause shall be heard,
tried, and determined in some of the state courts . . . ß°
This proposal is interesting because it reñected a concern with the
breadth of authority that the Constitution appeared to vest in the
inferior federal courts and because it portended a debate that
would recur in the First Congress over the scope of inferior federal
court jurisdiction.^!
The former point—the breadth of inferior federal court
authority that concerned New York's delegates—is mildly
instructive because it again suggests there was a sense that the
text vested those courts with power in such cases if the
Constitution was approved with its proposed language intact. One
order that Congress may not be compelled, as they wiU be under the present form, to
establish inferior federal courts . . . ." Id. at 550-51. Although the idea that Congress
would be obligated to establish inferior federal courts is inconsistent with the plain
language of Article III, the sentiment that Article III was in some respects imperative is
noteworthy.
3» The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (July 5, 1788), reprinted in 2
ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 408.
3' See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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could surmise that the delegates believed only an amendment of
the kind suggested above could ensure that this was not the case
since there was no discussion of any notion that Congress could
step in and curtail the jurisdiction in the manner the amendment
desired. The latter point—that this amendment foreshadowed a
central debate within the First Congress surrounding the
Judiciary Act of 1789—is interesting because it offers some
confirmation of the claim that members of the First Congress were
fighting battles that they had lost during the various
Constitutional Conventions.32 The New York delegates proposed
other jurisdiction-curbing amendments,^^ each of which only
'2 See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
^f The series of proposed additional amendments to Article III read as follows:
Resolve 1. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that all appeals
I fi:om any courts in this state, proceeding according to the course of the
j common law, are to be by writ of error, and not otherwise."
Res. 2. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that no judge of the
Supreme Court of the United States shall, during his continuance in office,
; hold any other office under the United States, or any of them."
I Res. 3. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power
I of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the same state,
I claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only to
' controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more
I persons, under grants of different states."
I Res. 4. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in the
, Constitution now under consideration contained, is to be construed to
I authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner what
j ever."
1 Res. 5. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power
of the United States, in cases in which a state shall be a party, is not to be
construed to extend to criminal prosecutions."
I Res. 6. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power
' of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of different states,
is not to be construed to extend to any controversy relating to any real
I estate not claimed under grants of different states."
I Res. 7. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power
! of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the same state,
claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only to
, controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more
' persons, under grants of different states."
Res. 8. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the person
, aggrieved by any judgment, sentence, or decree of the Supreme Court of the
^ United States, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the
I Congress shall make concerning the same, ought, upon application, to have
18 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [VoL 46:1
buttresses the view that they felt that the originally proposed text
vested the inferior federal courts with the authority to hear all of
the cases enumerated in Article III, Section 2 unless some
amendments were made.
Delegates to Pennsylvania's convention also pondered the scope
of federal jurisdiction, with some contending that it was too broad.
In response to this charge, James Wilson—also a delegate to the
Federal Convention—offered the following defense of the breadth
of the Judicial Power:
He said, "that the judicial powers were coextensive
with the legislative powers, and extend even to capital
cases." I believe they ought to be coextensive;
otherwise, laws would be framed that could not be
executed. Certainly, therefore, the executive and
judicial departments ought to have power
commensurate to the extent of the laws; for, as I have
already asked, are we to give power to make laws, and
no power to carry them into effect?̂ '*
Concededly, the suggestion that the Judicial Power should
generally be coextensive . with the power of the national
government does not necessarily mean that the power of the
a commission, to be issued by the President of the United States, to such
learned men as he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, appoint, not less than seven, authorizing such
commissioners, or any seven or more of them, to correct the errors in such
judgment, or to review such sentence and decree, as the case may be, and to
do justice to the parties in the premises."
Res. 9. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States, or of any other court to be
instituted by the Congress, ought not, in any case, to be increased,
enlarged, or extended, by any fiction, collusion, or mere suggestion."
The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (July 5, 1788), reprinted in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 408-09.
*• The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 469; see also id. at 489 ('The article respecting
the judicial department is objected to as going too far . . . . Controversies may certainly
arise under this Constitution and the laws of the United States, and is it not proper that
there should be judges to decide them?").
2011] THE JUDICIAL POWER 19
inferior federal courts must be coextensive in that regard. Rather,
Wilson could have meant that the Judicial Power as exercised
collectively by the Federal Judiciary would need to be coextensive
with the Legislature's power or that at a minimum the Supreme
Court needed to have authority of such breadth.^s Nevertheless, it
is also possible to see in this logic support for the idea that the
inferior courts require jurisdiction coextensive with the power of
the national government so that all of its laws might be
enforceable.36 In light of the language of Article III that Wilson
was defending—that the Judicial Power of the United States is
vested "in such inferior Courts" as Congress may establish—one
can at least legitimately use Wilson's defense of the coextensive
scope of the Judicial Power to argue that the inferior courts in
which such power is vested should have such coextensive authority
as well.
i Although not a proponent of expansive federal court
jurisdiction, Virginia's Patrick Henry revealed that he understood
the Constitution to confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction to
the extent indicated by the enumerated cases and controversies.
In opposing so empowering the federal courts he argued.
The sheriff comes to-day as a state collector. Next day
\ he is federal. How are you to fix him? How will it be
possible to discriminate oppressions committed in one
capacity from those perpetrated in the
other? . . . When you fix him, where are you to punish
35 This would be a view in line with the one articulated by Justice Story in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816). See also infra notes 104-05 and
accompansdng text.
36 Edmund Pendleton made the point about the need for the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to be coextensive with the authority of the national government and suggested that
the notion applied to the inferior courts as well as the Supreme Court:
' [T]he power of that judiciary must be coextensive with the legislative
1 power, and reach to all parts of society intended to be governed. They must
' be so arranged, that there must be some court which shall be the central
point of their operations; and because all the business cannot be done in
that part, there must be inferior courts to carry it on.
Tlie Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788), reprinted
in\Z ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at l, 517.
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him? [F]or I suppose they will not stay in our courts:
they must go to the federal court; for, if I understand
that paper right, all controversies arising under that
Constitution, or under the laws made in pursuance
thereof, are to be tried in that
Of course one could argue that Henry was simply voicing his
opinion that federal question cases were mandatorily vested in the
federal courts.^^ Nevertheless, the statement is reflective of the
sentiment common among delegates to the state conventions that
the grant of authority to the federal courts was quite broad. The
quotation is also typical in that it offers no hint of an
understanding that Congress could intervene to pare down the
jurisdiction granted to the federal courts. One might imagine that
opponents would have tempered their objections to some extent if
they believed this to be the case; proponents of the proposed
Federal Judiciary might have pointed to such a feature to pacify
the concerns of opponents had it been thought that Congress
would be so empowered.̂ s
3' Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
" This is part of the view propounded by Professor Akhil Reed Amar in his article A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 205, 240 (1985) ('The implication of the text, while perhaps not unambiguous, is
strong: although the judicial power must extend to all cases in the first three categories, it
may, but need not, extend to all cases in the last six.").
39 "fhis is exactly the approach taken by defenders of Article III who sought to ease
concerns regarding the scope of the Supreme Coxirt's appellate jurisdiction:
The appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, undoubtedly proper, and would not
have been objected to if they had not introduced, unfortunately, in this
clause, the words "both as to law and fact." Though I dread no danger, I
wish these words had been buried in oblivion. If they had, it would have
silenced the greatest objections against the section. I will give my free and
candid sentiments on it. We find them followed by words which remove a
great deal of doubt—^"with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as
Congress shall make;" so that Congress may make such regulations as they
may think conducive to the public convenience.
The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788)
(statement of Edmund Pendleton), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1,
519; see also id. at 534 (statement of James Madison) ('The principal criticism which has
been made, was against the appellate cognizance as well of fact as law. . . . PGf gentlemen
should contend that appeals, as to fact, can be extended to jury cases, I contend that, by the
word regulations, it is in the power of Congress to prevent it, or prescribe such a mode as
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I Perhaps the strongest affirmation of the idea that state
convention delegates read the Constitution to vest in the inferior
federal courts full jurisdiction over all the matters enumerated in
Section 2 of Article III comes from George Mason of Virginia. In
the Virginia Convention debates, he made the following remarks:
I
' The inferior courts are to be as numerous as Congress
; may think proper. They are to be of whatever nature
I they please. Read [Section 2 of Article III], and
I contemplate attentively the extent of the jurisdiction of
I these courts, and consider if there be any limits to it.
! I am greatly mistaken if there be any limitation
] whatsoever, with respect to the nature or jurisdiction
' of these courts. If there be any limits, they must be
' contained in one of the clauses of this section; and I
j believe, on a dispassionate discussion, it will be found
that there is none of any
Mason certainly was not under the impression that Congress had
thje authority to limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
to a subset of those matters set forth in Section 2. To the contrary,
up|on reading the document he stated that "there is none of any
check" on their jurisdiction. Fellow Virginia Convention delegate
John Tyler seemed to concur somewhat with Mason's
understanding when he stated, "Is there any limitation of, or
restriction on, the federal judicial power? I think not."4i
Ultimately, the Virginia Convention addressed its concerns with
the jurisdiction of the inferior courts by proposing an amendment
to Article III that would have eliminated the inferior federal courts
will secure the privilege of jury trial. They may make a regulation to prevent such appeals
entirely . . . .").
"" Id. at 521 (emphasis added); see also id. at 523 (statement of George Mason) ("I say
that the general description of the judiciary involves the most extensive jurisdiction. Its
cognizance, in all cases arising under the system and the laws of Congress, may be said to
be unlimited.").
'̂, Id. at 638-39; see also id. at 565 (statement of William Grayson) ("My next objection to
the federal judiciary is, that it is not expressed in a definite manner. The jurisdiction of all
cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Union is of stupendous
magnitude.").
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and replaced them with admiralty courts.̂ 2 Again, there must
have been some sentiment that Article III vested the inferior
federal courts with cognizance of all matters enumerated in
Section 2—^with no available check by Congress— îf the delegates
were so moved to abolish all but their admiralty jurisdiction by
amendment.
Besides the central issue of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the provisions of the Constitution that created and
bolstered the independence of the Federal Judiciary from the other
branches of the national government were a frequent point of
reference among those pondering the Constitution in the various
state conventions.*^ in Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth—himself a
delegate to the Federal Convention**—remarked.
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of
the general government. If the general legislature
should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial
department is a constitutional check. If the United
States go beyond their powers, if they make a law
which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void;
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to
secure their impartiality, are to be made independent,
will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the
states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which
is a usurpation upon the general government, the law
••2 Id. at 660 ("[T]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such courts of admiralty as Congress may irom time to time ordain and
establish in any of the different states.").
*^ See, e.g.. Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 4,
1788) (statement of Rev. Thomas Thacher), reprinted in 2 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27,
at 1, 145 ("The independence of judges is one of the most favorable circumstances to public
liberty; for when they become the slaves of a venal, corrupt court, and the hirelings of
tyranny, all property is precarious, and personal security at an end; a man may be stripped
of all his possessions, and murdered, without the forms of law."); The Debates in the
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 12, 1788) (remarks of Edmund
Pendleton), reprinted in 3 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 303 ("Whenever, in any
country in the world, the judges are independent, property is secure.").
" Ellsworth also served as the third Chief Justice of the United States. KENNETH
BERNARD UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES, at vii (1938).
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is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it
to be so.̂ ^
The need to have a dispersion and balancing of power within the
national government was also an important theme for state
convention delegates.*^ James Wilson of Pennsylvania articulated
the importance of the separation of powers by contrasting it with
the complete consolidation of authority that characterized the
Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation:
! Is the Senate, under the proposed Constitution, so
¡ tremendous a body, when checked in their legislative
I capacity by the House of Representatives, and in their
I executive authority by the President of the United
I States? Can this body be so tremendous as the present
I Congress, a single body of men, possessed of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers? To what
purpose was Montesquieu read to show that this was a
I complete t5a*anny? The application would have been
I more properly made, by the advocates of the proposed
I Constitution, against the patrons of the present
I Confederation.'*'̂
I
I In the Virginia Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph—
another former delegate to the Federal Convention—offered a
similar refrain when he stated.
I "5 Fragment of the Debates in the Convention of the State of Connecticut (Jan. 7, 1788),
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 185, 196.
i •'6 See id. at 198 (statement of Gov. Samuel Huntingdon) ("[I]f the government be
FJroperly balanced, it will possess a renovating principle, by which it will be able to right
itself."); The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (June 17, 1788) (remarks
of Robert Livingston), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 215 ("[I]f [the
federal government] was to enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive powers, an attention as
well to the facility of doing business as to the principles of freedom, called for a division of
those powers."); The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787)
(statement of James Wuson), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 479 ("I
shall mention another good quality belonging to this system. In it the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers are kept nearly independent and distinct.").
j "' The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 459.
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Are we not taught by reason, experience, and
governmental history, that tyranny is the natural and
certain consequence of uniting these two powers, or
the legislative and judicial powers, exclusively, in the
same body? . . . Whenever any two of these three
powers are vested in one single body, they must, at one
time or other, terminate in the destruction of liberty.'*^
As seen in the following review of the defense of the Constitution
offered in The Federalist, these themes of judicial independence
and separation of powers continued to hold center stage in the
discussion of the Judiciary.
C. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
Mining the passages within The Federalist for support for
constitutional arguments has long been the favorite pastime of
many a constitutional law scholar and member of the Court.̂ ^ The
shortcomings of using The Federalist as proof of any particular
interpretation of the Constitution are well-known. In a nutshell,
the argument is that the essays of The Federalist were advocacy
pieces^" written principally by two individuals—James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton^i—and, therefore, it is not wholly
legitimate to permit their explanation of text and meaning to
prevail over the understanding derived directly from the text itself
•" The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 16, 1788),
reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 83.
•"î See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In
deciding these cases, . . . it is The Federalist that finally determines my position. I believe
that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the Government's position
here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and
45."). See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is
There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243 (2005) (discussing
the Court's use of The Federalist to interpret the Constitution and decide cases).
50 See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1581-82 ("The Federalist Papers were, of course, political
debate, not constitutional exegesis.").
51 See James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of The
Federalist Papers, 1985 BYU L. REV. 65, 65 n.2 (attributing only five of the total eighty-five
essays to John Jay).
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or from the records of debates of those who considered and voted
on the Constitution.^^
That said, these writings are of immense value in that they give
analj^ical structure to arguments and sentiments espoused by the
Framers during the debates. They also serve as confirmation that
various threads of thought that one might discern from consulting
the Convention debates were indeed on the Framers' minds when
they crafted and pondered the constitutional text. To the extent
that these writings were read by people at the time, they also
reveal what the public at large may have understood to be the
purpose and meaning of various constitutional provisions.^^ In
sum, the writings of Hamilton and Madison are indispensable aids
for understanding the mind of the Convention and the original
understanding of those who ultimately passed judgment on the
Constitution's text.
Turning to the essays of the The Federalist, what do they tell us
about the Judicial Power that relates to our current topic? Much
(discussion respecting the Judiciary in The Federalist comes in the
context of explanation and defense of the separation of powers
scheme that emerged from the Convention. For Madison, the
driving motivator behind every aspect of the composition and
empowerment of each branch of the federal government was the
desire to avoid t3Tranny and governmental excess:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be
I pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the
federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with
¡ this accumulation of power, or with a mixture of
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an
! accumulation, no further arguments would be
• 52 For discussion of the use of The Federalist, see generally John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH, L. REV. 1337
(1998); Wilson, supra note 51.
\ 1*3 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 823 (2007)
(explaining the theoretical bases for citing The Federalist as evidence of original public
ineaning).
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necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the
system.̂ *
So the concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers
in the same hands was viewed as "the very definition" of tyranny.
Hamilton later explained the connection between an accumulation
of power and t5T:anny when he argued for the independence of the
Judiciary thusly:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains
certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no
bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts of
justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights
or privileges would aniount to nothing. ̂ ^
Absent a robust and independent Judiciary, there would be no
means of protecting the rights of the people, and the reservation of
those rights would become meaningless. How then was one to
avoid this dreaded accumulation of power?
According to Madison, the very separation of power into three
branches and then controlling the ability of one branch to
dominate the others was critical to forestalling the tyranny that
results from a concentration of power:
It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be
directly and completely administered by either of the
other departments. It is equally evident, that none of
THE FEDERAUSTNO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 271.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 451.
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them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an
overruling influence over the others in the
\ administration of their respective powers. It will not
1 be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and
' that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing
! the limits assigned to it.̂ ^
Although the need to delimit the precise boundaries of authority
among the branches was acknowledged as a necessary step in
protecting against a tyrannical regime, Madison—writing in The
Federalist No. 48—ultimately deemed such a step to be woefully
insufficient:
I Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the
! boundaries of these departments in the constitution of
! the government, and to trust to these parchment
' barriers against the encroaching spirit of
¡ power? . . . [E]xperience assures us that the efficacy of
¡ [that approach] has been greatly overrated; and that
some more adequate defense is indispensably
' necessary for the more feeble against the more
! powerful members of the government. The legislative
' department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex. 5''
In other words, articulating the limits of departmental power
would not suffice because the natural strength of the Legislature
in a republic is such that it will inevitably intrude upon the
spheres and prerogatives of the other two branches.^s
Indeed, Hamilton contrasted the strength of the Legislature
with the weakness and vulnerability of the Judiciary. Hamilton
said it best when he wrote.
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 279.
" Id.
58 See THE FEDERAUST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 294 ("In republican
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.").
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[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity
to annoy or injure them. . . . The judiciary . . . has no
inñuence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment....
This simple view of the matter suggests several
important consequences. It proves incontestably that
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the
three departments of power; that it can never attack
with success either of the other two; and that all
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself
against their attacks.^^
Such vulnerability demanded special efforts to protect the
Judiciary; otherwise, the inevitably stronger Legislature would
exploit its "natural feebleness."ß°
What then would be the means of constraining the authority of
the three branches, particularly the Legislative Branch? Madison
asked and answered this question at the beginning of The
Federalist No. 51:
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of
power among the several departments as laid down in
the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is
that as all these exterior provisions are found to be
inadequate the defect must be supplied, by so
contriving the interior structure of the government as
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
69 THE FEDERAUST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 450 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
^ Id. ("[F]rom the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being
overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches . . . .").
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I relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places.
But the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer
i each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
I others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
¡ other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of
I attack.^i
Thus, we see a threefold approach emerge: each of the three
branches was to be designed in a manner that would permit them
to exercise their vested authority independently; each required
some ability to check the behavior of any wayward branch; and the
separate departments were to be given the means of protecting
themselves against encroachments by the other departments,
i How was this approach translated into specifics? Focusing on
the Judicial Branch—the concern here—Madison indicated that
because members of the Judiciary would be dependent upon the
other branches for their appointment, there was a need to
neutralize that dependency through other measures bolstering
judicial independence. The two measures he alluded to were the
life-tenured status of the judges once appointed^^ and their
protection against diminution in pay.̂ ^ However, one could easily
t;ake the logic of his point to articulate a defense of the need for
other strong measures to keep the Judiciary separate and
independent from the other branches.
'< <" THE FEDERAUSTNO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 293-94 (emphasis omitted).
' 2̂ See id. at 293 ("[T]he permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that
department must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.").
• 3̂ See id. at 294 ("It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as
httle dependent as possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to their
ojEfices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in
this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.").
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Hamilton expounded on this point in The Federalist No. 78.
Remarking on the innovation of hfe tenure for federal judges,
Hamilton wrote.
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in
office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the
most valuable of the modern improvements in the
practice of government. In a monarchy it is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a
republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body. And it is the best expedient which can be
devised in any government to secure a steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws... .
. . . [A] s nothing can contribute so much to its
firmness and independence as permanency in office,
this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a
great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and
the public security.̂ ^
Hamilton also explained the importance of the guarantee against a
diminution in judicial pay by stating.
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed
provision for their support. . . . In the general course
of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will. And we can never
hope to see realized in practice the complete
separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in
^ THE FEDERAUST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 449-50; see also id. at
453 ("If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much
as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.").
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!
' any system which leaves the former dependent for
, pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the
; latter.65
I
Clearly, then, the independence and potency of the Judiciary were
of paramount importance; the Founders thus constituted the
Judicial Branch to preserve those principles.
I The founding vision of judicial independence and potency was
not left dependent solely upon the provision for life tenure and
salary protection. The scope of the Judiciary's authority was also
critical in this regard. As Hamilton explained, the Judiciary
needed to have authority that was "coextensive" with the scope of
federal legislative authority and competent to "giv[e] efficacy to
constitutional provisions."^^ Thus, he regarded it imperative that
the judicial authority extended to "all" of several classes of cases:
¡ [First], to all those which arise out of the laws of the
United States, passed in pursuance of their just and
constitutional powers of legislation; [second], to all
those which concern the execution of the provisions
expressly contained in the articles of Union; [third], to
I all those in which the United States are a party;
[fourth], to all those which involve the peace of the
confederacy, whether they relate to the intercourse
between the United States and foreign nations or to
that between the States themselves; [fifth], to all those
which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction; and lastly, to all those in
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be
impartial and unbiased.^''
By extending to all such matters, the Judiciary would be fully
conipetent to address all matters that the Legislature could touch.
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 457 (emphasis
omitted).
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 461-62.
67 Id. at 461 (emphasis omitted).
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a critical element in setting up the federal courts as a bulwark
against legislative excess. Similarly, cognizance of constitutional
questions would permit the Judiciary to protect the rights of the
people against encroachments by the other branches or by the
states. ̂ ^
It is worth noting that at the end of The Federalist No. 80,
Hamilton makes the following statement:
From this review of the particular powers of the
federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it
appears that they are all conformable to the principles
which ought to have governed the structure of that
department and which were necessary to the
perfection of the system. If some partial
inconveniences should appear to be connected with the
incorporation of any of them into the plan it ought to
be recollected that the national legislature will have
ample authority to make such exceptions and to
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to
obviate or remove these inconveniences.^^
Is Hamilton here endorsing the notion that the Constitution
permits the Legislature to remove some portion of the cases and
controversies falling within the Judicial Power from the
cognizance of the federal courts? Although such a reading of
Hamilton's words is possible—even plausible— ît is at least equally
plausible to limit the reference to Congress's authority to curtail
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Hamilton's
wording indicates that the latter is the better reading: the
«8 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 453 ("[T]he courts
of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative
encroachments "); THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 461
('The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things,
some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union and others with the
principles of good government. . . . No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government to restrain
or correct the infractions of them.").
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis added).
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Legislature will have the authority "to make such exceptions and
to; prescribe such regulations" as will obviate or remove any
inconveniences. This language closely tracks Article III, Section 2,
Clause 2:
!
! In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
i Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
; shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
; Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
1 the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
I both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
! under such Regulations as the Congress shall
; Hamilton likely had the text of the Constitution clutched
imimediately in his hand when he wrote his words given that he
had just quoted extensively from the previous clause of Section 2
in ¡the same essay.'̂ i That he was loosely quoting from Clause 2
here is thus all the more probable. That said, it is not disputed
that the constitutional language only confers upon Congress power
over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not the inferior federal
courts. Thus, if Hamilton was referring to the passage as a source
of congressional authority to hmit the jurisdiction of all federal
courts, he clearly misunderstood it; his statement cannot
transform the Clause into congressional authority that it
indisputably does not confer.
In sum, the essays of The Federalist reveal at least some of the
Fràmers' and the pubhc's understanding of Article III as being
extremely protective of the independence of the Judicial Branch.
Although the Constitution's promise of lifetime tenure and salary
protection for judges certainly reflects this independence, reading
the Constitution as furthering and protecting that independence
through direct vesting of the Judicial Power in the inferior federal
courts is also consistent with this vision of judicial independence,
given the need for judicial authority to be coextensive with the
™ U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
'i;See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 465-66 (quoting
and paraphrasing the language of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1).
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scope of legislative authority. Thus, although one fails to find a
direct endorsement of the constitutional vesting thesis among the
pages of The Federalist, one sees no rejection of it either, and one
certainly can imagine such vesting being consistent with the
Framers' desired level of independence for the federal courts.
* * * * *
The relevant contemporary evidence of the public debate
surrounding the development and adoption of the Constitution
reveals a clear theme with respect to the Judicial Department of
the newly created federal government: Separation of powers in the
service of judicial independence and judicial independence as a
backstop against tyranny. Far from being a matter of mere form—
or simply fodder for political rhetoric—the issue of separation of
powers and its concomitant concept of checks and balances resided
at the core of the plan of the Convention.''̂  Having revolted
against and overthrown a tyrannical regime that ruled from afar,
the new Americans were dedicated to devising a government that
would not be able to so dominate them from within. The means
identified for achieving this end was to divide power among
various departments, to set each one up as independent from the
other, and to vest each of them with some means of checking their
fellows.''3
'2 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 450 ("[T]here
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); The Debates in the
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 24, 1788) (statement of John Dawson),
reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 608 ("That the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers should be separate and distinct, in all free governments, is a political
fact so well established, that I presume I shall not be thought arrogant, when I affirm that
no country ever did, or ever can, long remain free, where they are blended.").
" See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (attached circuit court opinion by
Jay, C.J., Cushing, J., and Duane, D. J.) ("That by the Constitution of the United States, the
government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is
the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 411 Oetter of Wilson and Blair, JJ., and Peters, D.J.) ("It is
a principle important to freedom, that in government, the judicial should be distinct from,
and independent of, the legislative department. To this important principle the people of
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I Achieving this balance was a tricky matter. The Framers first
had to agree on what powers the national government as a whole
would have and then they had to decide to which department to
assign such powers. Although the assignment process in the
aggregate was a simple matter of assigning legislative, executive,
and judicial powers to the respective branches of Congress, the
President, and the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts, it
was on the margins where difficult decisions affecting the balance
of power between the three branches had to be made. For
example, would the trial of impeachments—clearly a judicial
piDwer—be placed within the Judicial Branch or would that matter
be better handled by another department?74 Should the
warmaking power—a seeming executive power traditionally
exercised by a country's head of state—lay exclusively in the hands
of our President or should such capability be dispersed?''^ Deciding
these matters one way or the other was what the game was all
about; going in either direction would substantially alter the
delicate balance the Framers were attempting to strike.
¡ Given what rested on these decisions at the margins, one is
obligated to honor the decisions made and take seriously the
allocations of power on which the Framers settled. In the next
P^rt, the Article will consider how Congress and the Court have
understood the nature of this allocation with respect to the
Judicial Power, leaving to Part IV an examination of whether this
traditional understanding is fully consonant with the text,
structure, and history surrounding the Constitution's relevant
texts.
the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard. They
have placed Ûieit judicial power not in congress, but in courts.").
'j" This matter was ultimately resolved in favor of assigning the trial of impeachments to
the Senate. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ('The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.").
'5 Dispersion of the warmaking power was achieved by giving Congress the power to
declare war, id.. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, but making the President the Commander in Chief of the
military forces, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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m. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER
The traditional view of the Judicial Power consists of the
understanding that the courts have the exclusive authority to
decide cases and controversies of the kind enumerated in Article
III, with no role in the dispute resolution process being reserved
for the Executive or Congress.''̂  Thus, neither the Executive
Branch'''' nor Congress''̂  may attempt review of the decisions of
Article III courts. Notwithstanding this exclusive judicial
authority, it is generally felt that Congress can manipulate the
class of cases over which the inferior Article III courts will have
cognizance.''̂
As discussed, the plan of the Convention was for the Judiciary
Branch to be, as near as possible, free from manipulation by the
other two branches to facilitate the untainted exercise of its vested
judicial authority. However, from the very beginning of the
Republic, Congress has asserted—and the Supreme Court has
acquiesced in—the power to withhold some portion of the Judicial
Power of the United States vested in the inferior federal courts
under Article III. The development and acceptance of this
congressional incursion into the judicial sphere will be reviewed
below.
'6 Miller V. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000) ("Article III 'gives the Federal Judiciary the
power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior
courts in the Article III hierarchy.' " (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218-19 (1995))).
•" Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 ("Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III
courts in officials of the Executive Branch." (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409)).
'8 Id. at 226 ("'[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any
circumstances, . . . be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the [ljegislature itself, in
whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested.' " (alterations in original) (quoting
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 (letter of Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, D.J.))).
™ See, e.g., Günther, supra note 9, at 912-14 (summarizing the traditional view); Bator,
supra note 6, at 1030-31 ("[Article III] leaves it to Congress to decide, having created lower
federal courts; what their jurisdiction should be—that is, to decide which of the cases to
which the federal judicial power extends should be litigated in the lower federal courts.").
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A.̂  THE UNDERSTANDING OF CONGRESS
Congress has always asserted the right to limit the jurisdiction
of the inferior federal courts.8° It was the First Congress that
initially created a collection of inferior federal courts in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.81 Beyond constituting these courts, the
Judiciary Act also provided in detail for their jurisdiction.
Regarding the district courts, the Act indicated that certain
matters were within their jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state
courts: minor crimes82 cognizable under the authority of the
United States, civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
matters involving seizures on land or other waters under the laws
of the United States, and suits against consuls or vice-consuls.^^
The same section of the Act then indicated that district courts
would have "concurrent" jurisdiction over causes where an alien
sues for a tort in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty
and all suits at common law by the United States valued of at least
orie hundred dollars.^* The Act assigned the circuit courts
concurrent jurisdiction over:
8» That Congress may limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not in
question. Article III provides:
I In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
¡ and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
I Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
' Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has affirmed
Congress's authority in this regard. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513
(1868) ("[W]hile 'the appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act, but are
given by the Constitution,' they are, nevertheless, 'limited and regulated by that act, and by
such other acts as have been passed on the subject.' " (quoting Durousseau v. United States,
10 p.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810))). Although the power of Congress to regulate the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is universally acknowledged, the scope of that
authority has been the subject of debate. See Günther, supra note 9, at 901-08 (describing
thelnarrow view of Congress's power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court).
81 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 73-74 (establishing the first district
courts).
82̂  The Act defined minor crimes as those subject to punishments not exceeding one
hunldred dollars of fines, six months of prison, or thirty lashes of the whip Id §9
83 Id.
^, Id.
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all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs,
the sum or value of fi.ve hundred dollars, and the
United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought and a citizen of another
State.85
The Act gave the circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
"cognizable under the authority of the United States," except that
jurisdiction over minor crimes was to be concurrent with the
district courts that were located where such crimes occurred.̂ ^
Congress also gave the circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over
matters coming from the district cotirts.^'' However, the Act
conferred no general federal question jurisdiction on the circuit or
district courts.8^ Thus, for both the district courts and the circuit
courts. Congress delineated the scope of their jurisdiction and
provided that such jurisdiction would extend only to a subset of
the cases and controversies described in Article III as comprising
the Judicial Power of the United States.
Debate over the Judiciary Act of 1789 embraced both
consideration of the desirability of limiting federal court
jurisdiction and of Congress's authority to do so.̂ ^ However, many
86 Id. § 11.
86 Id.
" Id.
88 See FALLÓN ET AL., supra not;e 8, at 320 ("The first Judiciary Act did not provide for
general federal question jurisdiction in civil cases . . . . Federal question cases that did not
fall into some more specialized grant of jurisdiction had to be litigated in state court, subject
to Supreme Court review.").
89 See Warren, supra note 9, at 67 ('This was the crucial contest in the enactment of the
Judiciary Act. The broad pro-Constitution men took the position that Congress had no
power to withhold from the Federal Courts which it should establish any of the judicial
power granted by the Constitution."). Indeed, Warren's useful research reveals that the
effort to reduce federal jurisdiction to a subset of the Article III Judicial Power was the
product of an effort on the part of some to undermine the broad grant of Article III in favor
of limited jurisdiction that trenched less upon the authority and dignity of the states. See
id. at 53 ('The fact is that the final form of the Ac t . . . was a compromise measure, so
framed as to secure the votes of those who, while willing to see the experiment of a Federal
Constitution tried, were insistent that the Federal Courts should be given the minimum
powers and jurisdiction.").
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members seemed to suppose that such authority existed and
focused their energy on determining the precise scope of the
prospective limits. A statement by Congressman William Smith of
South Carolina is illustrative of the presumption of many that
Congress could control inferior court jurisdiction. During the
debate over whether to approve the proposed Judiciary Act, Smith
indicated that after the House determined whether to create a
system of inferior federal courts, "the next [point] which occurs is
the extent of jurisdiction to be annexed to this court. . . . [S]ome
gentlemen are of opinion that the district court should be
altogether confined to admiralty causes; while others deem it
expedient that it should be entrusted with a more enlarged
jurisdiction."^"
Indeed, a major point of contention among members of the
House was whether the competency of the inferior federal courts
should be limited solely to admiralty jurisdiction.^^ The ultimate
limits decided upon were much broader than admiralty
jurisdiction, but the more important point for our purposes is that
the members of the First Congress clearly affirmed congressional
authority to impose jurisdictional limits on the inferior federal
courts when they enacted the final version of the Judiciary Act.
j One member of the House of Representatives in particular
spoke forcefully in favor of congressional authority to shape and
limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. Here is an
extended excerpt of a speech on the topic by Congressman Michael
Stone during the debates on the Judiciary Act:
I
I
' It appears from the words of the constitution, that
I Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish
; inferior courts, such as they think proper: Now, if this
so 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 828 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also id. at 848 (statement
of Rep. William Smith) ('The objection to the extent of jurisdiction is premature, and ought
to be reserved for the clause which ascertains the jurisdiction; if, upon an investigation of
that clause, it should appear that it ought to be restricted, that would be the seasonable
time for moving to strike out the exceptionable part.").
1̂ See id. at 827 (statement of Rep. Samuel Livermore) ("Now, if we have a Supreme
Court, to which appeals can be carried, and an Admiralty Court for deciding cases of a
maritime nature, our system will be useful and complete.").
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is a command for us to establish inferior courts, if we
cannot model or restrain their jurisdictions, the words
which give us the power from time to time so to do, are
vain and nugatory. . . . [T]he words ordain and
establish will not only go to the appointment of Judges
of inferior courts, but they comprehend every thing
which relates to them. . . . It is not said in that
instrument, that you shall exercise the judicial power
over all those cases, but that the judicial power shall
extend to those cases. If it had been the idea of the
convention that its Judiciary should extend so as
positively to have taken in all these cases, they would
have so declared it, and been explicit; but they have
given you a power to extend your jurisdiction to them,
but have not compelled you that extension.̂ ^
This statement is one of the clearest made by those debating the
Act in favor of congressional authority over inferior court
jurisdiction.
Was Stone correct in his argument that congressional authority
over the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts arose from the power
to "ordain and establish" such courts? Stone clearly conflates the
distinct issues of (1) whether Congress must create inferior federal
courts and (2) whether, once created, jurisdiction over the full
range of cases and controversies that comprise the Judicial Power
must be vested in such courts. Only the latter of the two points is
at issue here, and in supporting the latter point. Stone makes a
linguistic argument. He attempts to draw a distinction between
the existing language of Article III—that the Judicial Power "shall
extend" to certain cases—and what it otherwise might have said—
that "you shall exercise the Judicial Power over all those cases."
That the Framers did not employ the latter formulation is taken as
evidence of their intent to leave the scope of inferior court
jurisdiction to Congress.
Id. at 854-55.
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This wordplay should not be confused for sound argument. The
term "extend" is used in Article III because it is used to describe
the concept "Judicial Power." It would be improper to say "the
Judicial Power shall exercise all cases . . ." because that is not
something that Judicial Power can do. To make the sentence
proper using the term "exercise," the sentence would have to read
'ithe Judicial Power shall be exercised in all cases." But then the
sentence would no longer describe the nature and scope of the
Judicial Power; rather, it would describe what the courts are
supposed to do. In other words, the latter formulation would focus
on what the courts must do (exercise the Judicial Power in certain
cases) as opposed to focusing on explaining exactly what the
Judicial Power is (the Judicial Power extends to the enumerated
cases and controversies). But that is not the office of the first
sentence of Section 2; that clause describes the scope of the
Judicial Power. It is for Section 1 to vest that power in the
relevant components of the federal government—the Supreme
Court and any created inferior courts. Given the role of Section 2
as the definer of the Judicial Power, the Framers' word choice not
only makes sense, but is likely the clearest way that they could
have imparted an imperative meaning for the term.
Another observation will complete the refutation of Stone's
thesis. As noted above, the previous version of the Judiciary
ii^ticle considered by the Framers in the Convention used the
following language: "[t]he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend to all cases."^^ The Framers amended this language by
substituting "the Judicial power" in the place of "The jurisdiction
of the supreme Court."^* Certainly, Stone would have no warrant
for asserting that the previous language, that "[t]he Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases" would have been
insufficiently imperative regarding the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction simply because the Framers failed to say "The
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be exercised in all
cases . . . ." What other way could one craft a sentence to describe
the scope of the Court's jurisdiction than saying it "shall extend to
'3 Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, supra note 15, at 344.
1̂ '' Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, supra note 16, at 475.
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all cases" of a particular kind? Similarly, claiming that the
substituted language that one now finds in Article III does not do
the job is simply untenable; the Framers agreed and stated that
the Judicial Power "shall extend" to certain enumerated cases and
controversies.
B. THE VIEW OF THE COURT
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has also consistently
endorsed the notion that Congress has the authority to limit the
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.̂ ^ Although an advocate in
Turner v. Bank of North America^^ raised early on the idea that
Congress had no authority to vary the jurisdiction of inferior
federal courts from the class of cases and controversies in Section 2
of Article III, the Court rejected the argument. In that case,
counsel for the appellee—who was attempting to defend the
jurisdiction of a circuit court over a commercial paper dispute
based on diversity—argued,
[T]he judicial power, is the grant of the constitution;
and congress can no more limit, than enlarge, the
constitutional grant. . . . By the opposite construction,
however, congress has imposed a limitation upon the
judicial power, not warranted by the constitution,
when, without regard to the immediate parties to the
controversy, the law excepts from the cognizance of the
federal Courts, suits upon promissory notes, which, by
assignment, have placed the immediate parties, in the
relation of citizens of different states.^''
96 See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973) ("Article III describes
the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the
United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested 'in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may firom time to time ordain and establish.' The decision with respect to inferior
federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of
Congress." (quoting U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1)).
96 4 U.S. (4 DaU.) 8 (1799).
9' Id. at 10.
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I To this argument Chief Justice EUsworth^^ responded, "How far
is it meant to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed, that in
eyery case, to which the judicial power of the United States
extends, the federal Courts may exercise a jurisdiction, without
the intervention of the legislature, to distribute, and regulate, the
power?"99 Justice Chase expressly rejected the idea:
¡ The notion has frequently been entertained, that the
I federal Courts derive their judicial power immediately
' from the constitution; but the political truth is, that
• the disposal of the judicial power, (except in a few
I specified instances) belongs to congress. If congress
' has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not
\ otherwise: and if congress has not given the power to
us, or to any other Court, it still remains at the
legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound,
and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the
! jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in
every form, which the constitution might warrant. i°°
] The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the understanding
of Justice Chase on the matter when it offered the following
definitive statements in United States v.
Of all the Courts which the United States may, under
their general powers, constitute, one only, the
j Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived
I immediately from the constitution, and of which the
legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts
created by the general Government possess no
|98 Recall that Chief Justice Ellsworth was himself a delegate to the Federal Convention
and the ratifying Connecticut Convention. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
•99 Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 10 n.l.
1°" Id. Note Justice Chase's recognition that an acceptance of congressional authority over
federal court jurisdiction is a "political" rather than "constitutional" truth. This may reflect
the reality that Congress possessed a superior ability to impose its will than did the Court,
but it also could reflect a sense that such authority over jurisdiction would be exercised for
political reasons.
101 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that
creates them, and can be vested with none but what
the power ceded to the general Government will
authorize them to confer.
. . . [S]uch is the opinion of the majority of this
Court: For, the power which congress possess [sic] to
create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily
implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those
Courts to particular objects . . . .̂ "̂
The famous case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee^*^^ reaffirmed this
view, with a minor caveat. In the course of determining whether
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction extended to the review
of state court decisions, the Court indicated that Congress did
have the authority to parcel out jurisdiction among the federal
courts provided that the whole of the Judicial Power is vested in
the federal courts collectively.i""* Thus, according to the Martin
Court, so long as all of the Judicial Power was in the hands of the
collective of federal courts, how such power was apportioned
among those courts was for Congress to control.
A final citation will solidify the point. In Cary v. Curtis^'^^ the
Court sealed the status of this idea (of congressional power over
inferior court jurisdiction) as one of unquestionable validity when
it wrote.
'»2 Id. at 33.
103 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
I"* Id. at 331 ("It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to create some
inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is
exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original
cognizance. They might establish one or more inferior courts; they might parcel out the
jurisdiction among such courts, from time to time, at their own pleasure. But the whole
judicial power of the United States should be, at all times, vested either in an original or
appellate form, in some courts created under its authority."); see also Mclntire v. Wood, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813) ("[A]lthough the judicial power of the United States extends
to cases arising under the laws of the United States, the legislature have not thought proper
to delegate the exercise of that power to its Circuit Courts, except in certain specified
cases.").
106 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
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[One of] the doctrine [s] so often ruled in this court [is]
' that the judicial power of the United States, although
it has its origin in the Constitution, is (except in
enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this
! court) dependent for its distribution and organization,
and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the
' action of Congress, who possess the sole power of
• creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court)
1 for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing
¡ them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
! exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
I the exact degrees and character which to Congress
' may seem proper for the public good. To deny this
j position would be to elevate the judicial over the
' legislative branch of the government. . . .̂ "̂
Why the early Court took this view of congressional power over
jurisdiction—which goes against the interests of the Federal
Judiciary—is unclear; perhaps restraint in this area at this point
i.n the Court's history was wise, as it avoided a direct confrontation
with Congress that might have encouraged more encroachment on
£he exercise of the Judicial Power. In any event, the Court has
stood by this view in subsequent cases, each time simply asserting
(as in previous cases) rather than demonstrating or establishing
the veracity of the proposition. ̂ °''
j i»6 Id. at 245.
; 1°' See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) ('The effect of [Article
III] is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the designated cases and
controversies but to delimit those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon
such courts as it creates. Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly
from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict
such jurisdiction at its discretion . . . . The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts
the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress
to confer it."); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904) ("The Supreme Court alone
'possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, and of which the
legislative power cannot deprive it,' but the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts depends upon
some act of Congress." (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 33 (1812))); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867) ('The
Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress
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rv. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER
Having reviewed the historical context and the traditional
views of Congress and the Supreme Court respecting Article III,
does the traditional view represent an unduly narrow view of the
Judicial Power that impermissibly cedes to Congress authority
over the Federal Judiciary that it was not given and that it should
not have been permitted to take? One might derive from the
historical record an alternative understanding of Article III—that
it fully and directly vested the Judicial Power in all federal courts,
a view that, if correct, would preclude congressional manipulation
of the jurisdiction of inferior Article III courts once created. I refer
to this viewpoint as the "constitutional vesting thesis."
The constitutional vesting thesis—that all federal courts
(Supreme and inferior) are respectively vested with the Judicial
Power in full—^would mean that once constituted, an Article III
court constitutionally enjoys cognizance of all classes of cases and
controversies set forth in Article III. This goes well against the
prevailing current of thought on the matter throughout this
country's history, lô  However, even though the Supreme Court's
embrace of the view that Congress may limit the jurisdiction of
inferior federal courts is of ancient lineage, the proposition has
never satisfactorily been established by the Court. ̂ '̂ ^ At least one
must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. It is the duty of Congress
to act for that purpose up to the limits of the granted power. They may fall short of it, but
cannot exceed it. To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant. It can
be brought into activity in no other way."); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850)
("[I]t would seem to follow, also, that, having a right to prescribe. Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").
I»» See supra Part III.
109 The Court has employed a greater-includes-the-lesser-power line of reasoning to derive
and defend the notion of congressional control over inferior court jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ('The Congressional power to ordain and
establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction fi"om them in the exact
degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' " (quoting
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))). However, such a logical argument is not
satisfactory in the face of Article Ill's language and drafting history, as will be discussed in
this Part. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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lower court, a circuit court in Dundas v. Bowler,^^'^ deigned to
challenge the received wisdom that the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts is dependent upon a congressional dispensation
rather than on the Constitution itself:
j
' That the judicial power shall extend to controversies
I between citizens of different states, is clearly and in
terms declared in the constitution. Where suit is
i brought by the assignee of a note against the maker,
who lives in a different state, the case is literally
; within the constitution; and yet the act of congress
I declares the jurisdiction shall depend not alone upon
; the citizenship of the parties on the record, but also
i upon the citizenship of those by whom the note may
have been negotiated. In so far as this law is
restrictive of the constitutional right of a non-resident,
it is, in my judgment, unconstitutional. If congress can
I impose this restriction, they may go farther, and
I impose other restrictions, as their discretion may
' dictate. In this way a constitutional right may be
I modified or taken away in whole Or in part, as congress
may determine. This is a new and most dangerous
principle, and cannot be maintained. It is too late to
! say that a constitutional right, though explicitly given,
cannot be carried into effect, except through legislative
action. No legislation was required, and the only
' inquiry is, whether a legislative act can abrogate the
• right thus given. I am aware that the practice of the
courts of the United States has been different, and
' that, by frequent decisions, they have sanctioned the
law; and I am also aware that this has been done
I without inquiry, as to the validity of the act. Its
constitutionality has not been questioned, and, after so
many years of acquiescence, it may excite some
surprise that it is now questioned. Satisfied as I am
11» 8 F. Cas. 28 (CCD. Ohio 1843) (No. 4140).
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that the act restrictive of a constitutional right should
be held void, yet, by the course of decisions made on
the act under consideration, I cannot rest my decision
on its unconstitutionality."!
The position so well stated above is, in sum, that the Supreme
Court's embrace of the idea that Congress may manipulate the
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is a position arrived at
without thorough examination of its constitutionality.
Sheldon v. Sill^'^^ is illustrative of the Court's inadequate
analytical treatment of this issue. There, the Court directly
responded to the claim in Dundas that the jurisdiction-limiting
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were unconstitutional:
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had
ordained and established the inferior courts, and
distributed to them their respective powers, they could
not be restricted or divested by Congress. But as it
has made no such distribution, one of two
consequences must result[ ]—either that each inferior
court created by Congress must exercise all the judicial
powers not given to the Supreme Court, or that
Congress, having the power to establish the courts,
must define their respective jurisdictions. The first of
these inferences has never been asserted, and could
not be defended with any show of reason, and if not,
the latter would seem to follow as a necessary
consequence. And it would seem to follow, also, that,
having a right to prescribe. Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute
can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers. . . .
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
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Such has been the doctrine held by this court since
its first establishment. To enumerate all the cases in
which it has been either directly advanced or tacitly
assumed would be tedious and unnecessary.^^^
This type of ipse dixit is typical of the Court's treatment of this
principle, as was seen in the previous discussion of the Court's
ea,rlier cases.̂ ^^
I Can such non-analysis suffice as the foundation for acceptance
of! the doctrine that Congress has unquestioned authority to
constrain inferior Article III courts' exercise of the Judicial Power?
Challenges to this idea, as were articulated by counsel in Turner
arid the court in Dundas,^^^ deserve a much more reasoned
consideration given the gravity of the question they address and
the implications of a contrary view. This Article will now turn to
such a consideration.
j Article III reads, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.""^ From
this language all should agree that the Constitution vests "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States" in whatever "inferior Courts"
Congress may establish, the same Judicial Power that is vested in
the "one supreme Court." Many have suggested that this language
vests the Judicial Power in the Federal Judiciary as a whole, a
view that would permit Congress to partition the Judicial Power
and to allocate that power among components of the Judiciary as
Ccjngress sees fit.i^'' The wording of Section 1, however, challenges
113 Id. at 448-49.
I'i See supra Part III.B; see also Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 245 ("This argument is in
nowise impaired by admitting that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under
the, Constitution and laws of the United States. Perfectly consistent with such an
adinission is the truth, that the organization of the judicial power, the definition and
distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals, and the modes of their
actî on and authority, have been, and of right must be, the work of the legislature.").
115 See supra notes 96-100, 110-11 and accompanying text.
116 U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1.
" ' See, e.g.. Amar, supra note 38, at 231 ("[The] opening words of Article I I I . . . establish
that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in the federal judiciary as a
whole.").
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this view. Section 1 reads: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."ii8 Had the Framers intended a collective vesting, they
might have written "shall be vested in one supreme Court and
such inferior Courts as the Congress may" using the word "in" once
rather than twice. By using the word "in" two times. Section 1
directly vests all of the Judicial Power "in one supreme Court" but
also simultaneously vests the same Judicial Power "in such
inferior Courts" as Congress chooses to create. Thus, one can at
least question the apportionment-within-the-judiciary approach
because it renders nugatory the Section's language indicating that
the Judicial Power is vested fully "in" the Supreme Court "and in"
the inferior federal courts.̂ ^^
Turning then to what this Judicial Power embraces. Section 2 of
Article III reveals that this very same power "shall extend":
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
"8 U.S. CONST, art. ill, § l (emphasis added).
"9 It is for this reason that I disagree with Clinton's conclusion that the Judicial Power
must be vested in the Federal Judiciary as a whole. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 749-50
(explaining his conclusion). I also differ with his interpretation of the Exceptions and
Regulations Clause as empowering Congress to allocate federal jurisdiction among the
Supreme and inferior courts. See id. at 793 (reaching "the conclusion that 'exceptions'
contemplated under the exceptions and regulations clause were at most assignments of
portions of the judicial power from the Supreme Court to inferior federal courts"). Clinton
seems to acknowledge that not reading the Exceptions and Regulations Clause in this
manner would require an understanding of Article III that lacks any congressional
authority over inferior court jurisdiction, the proposition put forth in this Article. See id.
("[T]he framers must have intended the exceptions and regulations clause to be read in
conjunction and conformity with the mandatory first paragraph of the judiciary article,
rather than in isolation, as it has most often been construed since the Convention.
Otherwise, the deletion of the power to assign jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts
would have left Congress without any explicit grant of authority in the judiciary article to
so allocate the judicial power of the United States.").
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¡ Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—^between a State and Citizens of another
i State;—^between citizens of different States;—^between
i Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
i Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
' Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
I Subjects. 120
I
Putting the two provisions together, it appears that whatever
"inferior Courts" that Congress estabhshes are "vested" with a
power that includes all of the "Cases" and "Controversies" to which
the "judicial Power shall extend"; the use of the term "shall" here
being imperative.121
' Indeed, Justice Story long ago indicated that this language was
critical when he wrote:
I
¡ The language of the [third] article throughout is
I manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the
legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that
! congress could not, without a violation of its duty, have
refused to carry it into operation. The judicial power
of the United States shall be vested (not may be vested)
in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as
12» U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 2, cl. l.
121 See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress'Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 133 ("Article III certainly is imperative in mood. The only
candid reading of the text imports a mandatory duty to vest. 'Shall' is an auxiliary verb
that normally denotes more than mere futurity or prediction; in the second or third person
it ordinarily expresses some degree of compulsion by the will of the speaker (here, 'We the
People'), rather than mere preference, wish, or recommendation. The word usually is
indicative of command, converting what otherwise would be a declarative statement into an
imperative one."). Engdahl's understanding of the imperative meaning of the term "shall"
did not lead him to embrace the constitutional vesting thesis propounded in this Article.
See id. at 134 ("Of course, this does not mean that Congress must vest the full range of
contemplated subject matter jurisdiction in each federal court, if more than one exists.
Should Congress elect to have more than the one federal court constitutionally required,
Art;icle Ill's mandate could be satisfied by distributing the subject matter competence—so
loiig as every fraction of the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction was vested somewhere
in the judicial branch.").
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congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.
Could congress have lawfully refused to create a
supreme court, or to vest in it the constitutional
jurisdiction? . . . But one answer can be given to th[is]
question[ ]: it must be in the negative. 122
Although not the position advocated by Justice Story, the question
posed at the end of this excerpt might as easily have read: Could
Congress have created inferior courts but lawfully refused to vest
in them the constitutional jurisdiction? Justice Story deftly drove
home the point when he highlighted the mandatory nature of the
vesting clauses of the two preceding constitutional articles:
The same expression, "shall be vested," occurs in
other parts of the constitution, in defining the powers
of the other co-ordinate branches of the government.
The first article declares that "all legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the
United States." Will it be contended that the
legislative power is not absolutely vested? [T]hat the
words merely refer to some future act, and mean only
that the legislative power may hereafter be vested?
The second article declares that "the executive power
shall be vested in a president of the United States of
America." Could congress vest it in any other person;
or, is it to await their good pleasure, whether it is to
vest at all? It is apparent that such a construction, in
either case, would be utterly inadmissible. Why, then,
is it entitled to a better support in reference to the
judicial department?i23
Again, Justice Story's ultimate view was that, though mandatory,
the Constitution could distribute the Judicial Power within the
Federal Judiciary as a whole. But might an equally plausible view
be—given the mandatory nature of the vesting and the "and in"
122 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29 (1816).
»23 Id. at 329-30.
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language of Section 2 highlighted above—that this imperative
vesting applies with equal force to the inferior courts on their own?
; Professor John Harrison points out that although the "Judicial
Power" may be vested in the inferior federal courts, that term is
different from the concept of "jurisdiction," with the latter being a
niore narrow concept over which Congress may exercise control. ̂ 24
Although this distinction between Judicial Power and jurisdiction
niay be a valid one, it would remain to be established that
Congress is given authority to control the latter. Such authority is
traditionally drawn not from an express grant of jurisdictional
ccintrol in Article III but rather from Congress's power to "ordain
and establish" inferior Article III courts.i^s Must the lesser
authority to delimit the jurisdiction of these inferior courts
necessarily fall with the greater authority to create and abolish
them?i26 While the creator ordinarily might presume the power to
shape the scope of authority its creation will enjoy. Article III does
12« John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and
the^ Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 214-15 (1997).
125 U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1.
126 The greater-includes-the-lesser argument is well-worn. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ('The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts
includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' " (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))); Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional
Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143,
145 (1982) ("Since Congress need not have created lower courts, it could just as easily
abolish them altogether. Because it retains this broad power. Congress may exercise the
'lesser' power of 'abolishing' lower federal courts as to certain issues—i.e., limit their
jurisdiction."). This argument is also alluded to in Günther, supra note 9, at 899:
¡ The second part of that sentence is relied upon heavily by those who assert
i that there exists a broad congressional authority to curtail the jurisdiction
I of the lower federal courts: since "inferior Courts" are not mandated by the
; Constitution and since Congress has explicit discretion whether or not to
] "ordain and establish" them, the argument goes. Congress presumptively
^ may give or take away whatever portions of the "judicial Power" it wishes.
Professor Paul Bator referenced, but did not make, this "mechanical" argument regarding
Congress's authority to regulate inferior court jurisdiction. See Bator, supra note 6, at 1031
('The position that Congress has this additional power to 'pick and choose,' to create lower
federal courts and give them less than the entire federal judicial power, is not based
primarily on the mechanical argument that the greater power (not to create such courts at
all) ¡must include the lesser (to create them but Umit their jurisdiction).").
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not leave the cognizance of these inferior courts an open matter.
To the contrary. Article III is clear that although Congress gives
inferior courts their life, the same Article vests those courts with
the "judicial Power of the United States," which "shall extend" to
the list of matters enumerated therein. Further, the overall
constitutional framework alters the ordinary presumption that the
power to create an entity comprehends the authority to shape and
structure its workings as the creator sees fit. The plan of the
Convention was one that concerned itself mightily with achieving
as near as possible a separation of one department from the other
two, with a specific eye towards devising a Judiciary that was
independent and free to exercise its Judicial Power. ̂ ^̂  The clear
wording of the text vests the full Judicial Power in the inferior
federal courts. Implying a congressional power to deny the inferior
federal courts some portion of that same power opposes the
principle of judicial independence the Framers were intended to
enshrine.
Indeed, we have a record of the extent of the drafters'
commitment to judicial independence; the drafters unanimously
voted to strike the following language from an early draft of what
would become Article III: "The Legislature may assign any part of
the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President
of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations
which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall
constitute from time to time."i28 The rejection of this clause leads
to two conclusions. First, it can hardly be claimed that Congress
implicitly enjoys an authority that the drafters voted to eliminate.
The power that the delegates to the Convention withdrew from
Congress—the power to assign "part of the jurisdiction" and "in
the manner, and under the limitations" Congress thought proper—
is the very power that Congress arrogated to itself in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 and has enjoyed ever since.̂ ŝ Second, that this
12' See infra Part IL
128 Compare Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, supra note 15, at 334 (presenting an
early draft of Article III), with Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, supra note 16, at 476
(striking the quoted provision from the draft).
129 See supra Part III.A-B.
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aniendment to the draft Constitution was part of a comprehensive
effort to shore up the independence of the Judiciary in the
enjoyment and exercise of its Judicial Power is evident. Clearly,
the power to assign only a "part" of the jurisdiction extended to the
federal courts would give Congress the ability to undermine and
niarginalize the inferior federal courts by manipulating their
jurisdiction. 130 If Congress felt inclined against the positions that
the courts were taking in a particular field, it could respond with
the expedient of withdrawing from them all cognizance of such
niatters.i^i Such a state of affairs would not reflect the judicial
independence the Founders sought, but rather would subordinate
the inferior courts to the will of the Federal Legislature. The
principles of judicial independence and separation of powers held
so dear by those who drafted and adopted the Constitution^^^
should not be deemed to include any caveat that would permit
congressional authority of this kind.
I Several members of Congress who initially debated the
Judiciary Act offered a sound reason for supposing that the
Constitution compelled the vesting of the full Judicial Power in
whatever inferior courts Congress created. The failure to vest
inferior federal courts with such authority would leave the
adjudication of important matters within the Judicial Power of the
United States in the hands of the state courts, a result that would
be both imprudent and arguably inconsistent with the plan of the
Constitution. Debate revealed several iterations of this argument.
\ The most notable occurred in response to a motion to amend the
proposed Judiciary Act to ehminate a provision for U.S. district
courts in favor of instituting inferior federal courts solely with
admiralty jurisdiction:
13° See Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. 28, 28-29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4140) ("If congress
can impose this restriction, they may go farther, and impose other restrictions, as their
discretion may dictate. In this way a constitutional right may be modified or taken away in
whole or in part, as congress may determine.").
131 See FALLÓN ET AL., supra note 8, at 321 ("[P]erhaps the most controversial proposals to
lirait the jurisdiction of the federal courts have been those that reflect a substantive
disagreement with the way the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or both have
resolved particular issues.").
132 See supra notes 43-48, 54-65 and accompanying text.
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There is another important consideration; that is,
how far the constitution stands in the way of this
motion. It is declared by [the Constitution] that the
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one supreme, and in such inferior courts as Congress
shall from time to time establish. Here is no
discretion, then, in Congress to vest the judicial power
of the United States in any other tribunal than in the
Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United
States. It is further declared that the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to all cases of a
particular description. How is that power to be
administered? Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the
United States; if the judicial power of the United
States extends to those specified cases, it follows
indisputably that the tribunals of the United States
must likewise extend to
Here we see the suggestion that Congress may not vest any of the
Judicial Power of the United States in state courts, which is
precisely what would occur—albeit by default— îf Congress created
no inferior federal courts or if Congress created inferior federal
courts whose jurisdiction did not extend to the full complement of
cases and controversies outlined in Article III.î '*
Other Members emphasized the imprudence of limiting the
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in the manner proposed:
133 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 831-32 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. William
Smith) (emphasis added); see also id. at 843 (statement of Rep. James Madison) ("[Tjn the
new constitution a regular system is provided; the Legislative power is made effective for its
objects; the Executive is co-extensive with the Legislative, and it is equally proper that this
should be the case with the Judiciary.").
i3'> See also id. at 835 (statement of Rep. Egbert Benson) ("It is not left to the election of
the Legislature of the United States whether we adopt or not a judicial system like the one
before us; the words in the constitution are plain and full, and must be carried into
operation."). This is not offered to suggest or endorse the idea that state courts may not
enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over some or all of the cases and controversies within the
Judicial Power of the United States, but merely to reOect contemporaneous impressions of
the extent to which the full Judicial Power was vested in inferior federal courts.
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[W]hat is the object of the present motion? Sir, it goes
I to divest the Government of one of its most essential
i branches; if this is destroyed, your constitution is but
the shadow of a Government.
! Is it not essential that a Government possess within
' itself the power necessary to carry its laws into
i execution? But the honorable gentleman proposes to
i leave this business to a foreign authority, totally
I independent of this Legislature, whether our
I ordinances shall have efficacy or not. Would this be
I prudent, even if it were in
The argument now becomes even clearer. Even if Congress had
the authority to create inferior federal courts neutered of all but
their admiralty jurisdiction, doing so would undermine the very
government the Constitution was designed to create. This very
pirudential argument is what buttresses the constitutional point:
The plan of the Convention was to overcome the deficiencies of the
Articles of Confederation to create a strong national government
whose laws were supreme and that had the capacity—^through its
Judiciary—to see to that end.î ^ Any interpretation of Article III
that permitted Congress to create inferior federal courts that
lacked some component of the full Judicial Power of the United
States would thus be inconsistent with the plan of the Convention
because not only would judicial independence be undermined, but
135 Id. at 836 (statement of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) (emphasis added); see also id. at 837-
38 (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames) ("[U]ntil miracles shall become more common than
ordinary events, . . . he should think it a wonderful felicity of invention to propose the
expedient of hiring out our judicial power, and employing courts not amenable to our laws,
instead of instituting them ourselves as the constitution requires.").
136 See, e.g.. The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787)
(statement of James Wilson), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 459
(ci-iticizing the then-current government of the Articles of Confederation); cf. 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 837 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames) ('The judicial
power is, in fact, highly important to the Government. . . because by this means its laws are
peaceably csirried into execution. We know, by experience, what a wretched system that is
which is divested of this power.").
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the ability of the federal government to ensure that its laws were
properly executed and preserved as supreme would be gutted.i^''
To be sure, the soundness of this alternative view of
congressional authority is questionable, as critics of this viewpoint
abound. Professor Theodore Eisenberg suggested long ago that
reading Article III to vest inferior federal courts with cognizance of
the full array of matters outlined in Section 2 is "faulty.''̂ ^^ It is
important to note, however, that he based his critique of the
constitutional vesting thesis on a policy argument, not on
interpretation of the constitutional text, and rooted it in his
debatable belief that the Constitution requires the creation of
inferior federal courts. ̂ ^̂  His argument, that "an overabundance
of federal forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal
cases could in fact undermine the judiciary,"!*" might be an apt
description of the consequences of the constitutional vesting thesis,
but it does not speak to whether a proper understanding of Article
Ill's text, structure, and history warrant an acceptance of the
position nonetheless.
Other critics have challenged the constitutional vesting thesis
on the ground that the "Madisonian Compromise"—the decision to
leave the creation of inferior federal courts to Congress rather
creating them in the Constitution '̂'̂ —^warrants the conclusion that
Congress has the power to regulate the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts.̂ ^^ According to Professor Paul Bator,
137 Congressman Sedgwick buttressed this point by recounting the widespread scofflawry
of the states under the Articles of Confederation with respect to an American treaty with
Great Britain concerning the dehts of Americans owed to British suhjects. 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 837 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) (noting
that "State after State" made laws contrary to the national treaty with Britain and that
"the State Judiciaries could not, or did not, decide contrary to their State ordinances").
138 Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 514-15 (1974).
139 Id.
I"» Id. at 515.
1̂1 FALLÓN ET AL., supra note 8, at 319.
"^ See Bator, supra note 6, at 1031 (arguing that the purpose of the compromise was to
give Congress discretion over creation and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); Günther,
supra note 9, at 912 (arguing the same).
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The essence of that compromise was an agreement
i that the question whether access to the lower federal
I courts was necessary to assure the effectiveness of
! federal law should not be answered as a matter of
¡ constitutional principle, but rather, should be left a
matter of political and legislative judgment. . . . It
would make nonsense of that notion to hold that the
only power to be exercised is the all-or-nothing power
I to decide whether none or all of the cases to which the
I federal judicial power extends need the haven of a
I lower federal court, i'*̂
Bator's view conflicts with the evidence from the Convention
reviewed above. Although it is possible that implicit in the
Madisonian Compromise was an understanding that Congress
would have the discretion to dole out to inferior federal courts
some lesser portion of the Judicial Power of Article III, the
Framers explicitly rejected proposed language that would have
invested Congress with exactly such a power, i*"* Indeed, beyond
the Madisonian Compromise and repeated indications that the
constitutional vesting thesis "has been repudiated by an unbroken
line of authoritative judicial and legislative precedent,"^^^ Bator
offers little more to commend the traditional view of congressional
authority than the Court ever has.
The following comment from Bator thus overstates the case for
the traditional view: 'The Constitution contains many provisions
that are not at all clear. It does, however, contain a few that are
clear. One of the clearest is the power of Congress to regulate the
jjurisdiction of federal '[t]ribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court.' "i"*̂  Article III says nothing of Congress's authority to
regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, a fact that is
rooted in the Framer's excision of a clause that would have
granted such authority from the proposed text. Further,
: i''3 Bator, supra note 6, at 1031.
!•'•' See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
("s Bator, supra note 6, at 1031.
I« Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
60 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
Article III explicitly gives Congress such regulatory authority
when it comes to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
strongly indicating that the failure to extend such authority with
respect to the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts means that
it was excluded; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To suggest
that the contrary view is one of the "clearest" aspects of the
Constitution cannot be simply accepted uncritically.
Professor Akhil Amar has offered a plausible argument in
response to the constitutional vesting thesis with his idea that
Section 2 of Article III has "two tiers" of matters that comprise the
Judicial Power, one mandatory and one discretionary."^
Specifically, his argument is as follows: Because Section 2 extends
the Judicial Power to "all cases" but then just to "controversies"
rather than all controversies of a particular kind, the first tier of
Section 2—addressing "cases"— îs mandatory and must be fully
vested in some federal court while the second tier—covering
"controversies"—is permissive and allows Congress to decide what
portion of those matters inferior courts may entertain."»
There are two ways to respond to this argument. First, the
omission of the word "all" from the portion of the Clause referring
to those controversies that "shall" comprise part of the Judicial
Power could be read simply as an indication that state courts could
concurrently entertain such controversies. The use of "all" for the
series of cases listed in the initial portion of the Clause would then
be read as indicative of a command that the entirety of cases
falling within such description are within the Judicial Power,
which is vested exclusively in the Federal Judiciary whose
members are to have life tenure and protected compensation. This
reading would not permit state courts to exercise any part of this
authority. This could have been the original understanding of the
Framers; debates on the Judiciary Act of 1789 reveal that some
members of Congress believed that the states could not exercise
!•" Amar, supra note 38, at 240.
1̂8 Sgg ¿¿ ('The implication of the text, while perhaps not unambiguous, is strong:
although the judicial power must extend to all cases in the first three categories, it may, but
need not, extend to all cases in the last six. The choice concerning the precise scope of
federal jurisdiction in the latter set of cases seems to be given to Congress . . . .").
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jurisdiction over those matters falling within the Judicial Power.i^^
However, this interpretation has long been rejected. Both
Congressi^" and the Court̂ î have held that states may exercise
jurisdiction in the cases listed after the "all" modifier of Section 2.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist No. 82 also seemed
to reject this view when he wrote,
I am even of opinion that in every case in which they
I were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the
national legislature, they will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give
! birth. . . . The judiciary power of every government
! looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in
I civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between
\ parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant
I part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New
i''9 See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 844 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
James Madison) ("On the whole, . . . [I cannot] see how it could be made compatible with the
constitution, or safe to the Federal interests, to make a transfer of the Federal jurisdiction
to the State courts . . . ."); id. at 850 (statement of Rep. William Smith) ('The words, 'shall
be vested,' have great energy, they are words of command; they leave no discretion to
Congress to parcel out the Judicial powers of the Union to State judicatures . . . . Does not,
then, the constitution, in the plainest and most unequivocal language, preclude us &om
allotting any part of the Judicial authority of the Union to the State judicature?").
!«> See, e.g.. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 9 (granting federal district courts
only concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over claims by foreign citizens arising firom
the violation of a treaty and common law claims by the United States when the amount in
controversy exceeded one hundred dollars).
^̂ 1 The Supreme Court spoke of state court authority to hear matters falling within the
Article III Judicial Power thusly:
It is certainly true that state courts of "general jurisdiction" can adjudicate
cases invoking federal statutes, such as § 1983, absent congressional
1 specification to the contrary. "Under [our] system of dual sovereignty, we
I have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are
I thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws
of the United States," Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). That this
would be the case was assumed by the Framers, see The Federalist No. 82,
I pp. 492—493 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Indeed, that state courts could enforce
I federal law is presumed by Article III of the Constitution, which leaves to
Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts at all.
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 36fr-67 (2001).
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York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our
courts. . . . [T]he inference seems to be conclusive that
the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction
in all cases arising under the laws of the Union where
it was not expressly prohibited. 1̂2
In the end, the matter is sufficiently unclear, and one may resolve
the matter by following the collective wisdom of Congress and the
Court (echoed by Hamilton) that jurisdiction over "cases" was not
to be exclusive of the states, at least for our present purposes, î ^
An alternative understanding of the lack of the modifier "all"
with respect to the enumerated controversies is that the Judicial
Power extends to such controversies, but the federal courts retain
discretion to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over all
such matters. This is a slight but important variant of the
interpretation to which it is opposed. Amar's two-tiered view
suggests that the Constitution distributes identified controversies
to inferior federal courts according to the wishes of Congress
because the Constitution does not extend the Judicial Power to
"all" such controversies. 15* But the fact that the Judicial Power
does not specify "all" such controversies does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that the Constitution vests Congress with any
role in determining which of these controversies the courts may
entertain. No language in Article III makes such a suggestion,
and, as we have already seen, the Framers rejected a
congressional role in manipulating the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts during the Federal Convention. 1̂^ So if any
discretion exists to forbear from the exercise of jurisdiction over
some subset of the controversies described in Section 2, perhaps
that discretion lies with the Federal Judiciary.
Ultimately, Professor Daniel Meltzer does the best job of
dismantling Amar's two-tier theory but does so in the direction of
162 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 478-79.
163 My purpose here is not to defend or establish the notion that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over the matters enumerated in Section 2 of Article III. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to address the exclusivity issue.
1" Amar, supra note 38, at 229-30.
166 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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arguing that none of the nine enumerated classes of cases must be
niandatorily within the cognizance of the inferior federal courts.
Meltzer echoes the idea of another commentator that the Framers
used the modifier "all" to emphasize that the cases falling within
the Judicial Power were to include both criminal and civil matters,
a clarification not necessary for an enumeration of "controversies,"
which were generally understood to be only civil in nature.^^^
Setting that point aside, Meltzer demonstrates that there is not
really any evidence supporting the idea that the Framers placed
the weight on the use of the word "all" in Section 2 that Amar
dpes.i '̂' Surely a specification of such import would have
commanded at least a remark by one of the gentlemen considering
the proposed Constitution. None can be found, a fact that Meltzer
treats as weighing heavily against Amar's thesis.̂ ^^
I Finally, does the fact that the First Congress—comprised of
members who participated in the Federal Constitutional
donvention^^^—itself rejected the constitutional vesting thesis
undermine its validity? The efforts of Convention delegates to rid
Article III of proposed provisions that would have provided for
greater congressional authority over the jurisdiction of the inferior
6̂6 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1575 (citing William A. Fletcher, Correspondence, Exchange
on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 131, 133 (1990)).
16' For example, after enumerating the cases and controversies that fell within the
Judicial Power, Edmund Pendleton, President of the Virginia Convention, said, "Without
eritering into a distinction of all its parts, I believe it will be found that they are all cases of
general and not local concern. The necessity and propriety of a federal jurisdiction, in all
such cases, must strike every gentleman." The Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27,
at' 1, 518. Clearly Pendleton did not distinguish between two tiers of jurisdiction here but
rather saw "all such cases" as necessitating federal jurisdiction.
1,68 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1578-79 ('The short of the matter is that Amar has not
identified any speech at the Convention or ratification debates that articulated a distinction
between mandatory and permissive jurisdictions.").
169 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) ("A contemporaneous
exposition of the constitution . . . is the judiciary act itself. We know that in the Congress
which passed that act were many eminent members of the Convention which formed the
constitution."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Original Intent in the First Congress, 71 Mo. L. REV. 687,
689 (2006) ("At least twenty-eight members of the House and fourteen members of the
Senate had been delegates to their respective state ratifying conventions. Nine delegates to
the Constitutional Convention served in the House and eleven served in the Senate."
(footnotes omitted)).
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federal courts offers at least one compelling counterweight to that
evidence. 1̂° Further, Professor Charles Warren long ago
uncovered the fact that members of Congress who were
disgruntled with the breadth of Article Ill's grant of jurisdiction
used the Judiciary Act of 1789 to accomplish a narrowing of
authority that proponents failed to get in the final document
emerging from the Federal Convention. ̂ ^̂  To the extent that there
is evidence of sentiment within the First Congress both that the
jurisdictional grant of Article III was overly broad and that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was the opportunity to correct that error, ̂ ^̂
such evidence could undermine the value of pointing to the actions
of the First Congress as confirming eviderice that the
constitutional vesting thesis is invalid. ̂ ^̂
1™ See supra notes 12-21 and accompanjdng text.
1̂1 See Warren, supra note 9, at 62-63 (" 'I am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing that
promises to send this system [the judicial system designed by the Judiciary Act of 1789] out,'
free from those vexations and abuses that might have been warranted by the terms of the
Constitution.' " (quoting Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (May 28, 1789), in 2
THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE (James Curtis Ballagh ed. 1912))); see also Meltzer,
supra note 5, at 1611 ("[T]oday's congressional debates are uncertain evidence of
contemporary constitutional understandings. Similar caution is equally appropriate in
looking back to 1789, when the new legislators may have been re-fighting old battles about
the Constitution, unwilling to carry out any constitutional imperatives they divined."
(footnotes omitted)).
1̂2 Amar has speculated that Anti-Federalist dominance of the First Congress accounts for
its legislative efforts in directions potentially at odds with the vision of the Convention. See
Amar, supra note 38, at 259 ("Because the Anti-Federalist forces wielded far more power in
the first Congress than they had at Philadelphia, it would not be surprising if the Act only
imperfectly reflected the Federalist vision that had eeirlier been crystallized in the
Constitution." (citing Warren, supra note 9, at 53)). But see Sirico, supra note 159, at 692
("The Federalists dominated the new Congress, initially holding forty-nine of fifty-nine
seats in the House and twenty of twenty-two seats in the Senate." (citing CHARLENE BANGS
BicKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS,
1789-1791, at 4 (1989))).
1̂3 Meltzer offers an additional reason to temper the credence one accords to the views of
the inaugural legislators of our Union; he surmises that there may be less value in the
opinions of the Members of the First Congress because they were "confused":
[O]ne thing I have learned from delving into the surviving records of
debates about the Act is how many of the participants were confused. . . .
Perhaps the most fundamental example of confusion involves the question
whether article III obhges Congress to create lower federal courts or give
them jurisdiction over any particular matters. The history of the
Convention clearly shows that the answer is no . . . . Yet in the first
Congress . . . it was not uncommon to hear just the opposite asserted.
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I In sum, when one combines the language of the Vesting Clause
with the history of Article III—which includes a rejection of
congressional power to distribute "any part" of the federal
jurisdiction to inferior federal courts—and its structure—which
elsewhere includes a similar congressional power over Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction, it at least becomes more plausible to
suppose that the Constitution reflects a lack of congressional
authority over inferior court jurisdiction rather than the presence
of I such power.
I What would be the implications associated with an embrace of
the constitutional vesting thesis? The most troubling implication
arising from an acceptance of the constitutional vesting thesis is
that congressional curtailment of the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts to a subset of the cases and controversies
enumerated in Article III, Section 2 is impermissible. Clearly, to
suggest such a proposition is audacious. ̂ ^̂  If members of the First
Congress presumed the authority to impose such limits, surely any
assertion to the contrary must be untenable.^^^ Although members
of'the First Congress are entitled to some degree of deference, can
they bind us to constitutional understandings that are
unsupported by the history, text, and structure of the Constitution
itself? There is also the point that Warren's research surrounding
the Judiciary Act of 1789 revealed: Members of the First Congress
were politicians with particular agendas, most notably an agenda
aimed at undoing much of what Article III had done—vest the
Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1610-11.
1«"̂  Cf Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. 28, 29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4140) ("Its
constitutionahty has not been questioned, and, after so many years of acquiescence, it may
excite some surprise that it is now questioned.").
i«5 The Supreme Court has treated the views of the First Congress as dispositive on an
issue and has used their actions as the bases for resolving constitutional questions in the
past. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) ("History reveals an unbroken
congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of
term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under
the same regime. As earlier recounted, the First Congress accorded the protections of the
Nation's first federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike." (citation
omitted)).
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inferior courts with broad jurisdiction over a wide swath of cases
and controversies. 1̂^
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately the traditional view challenged here—that Congress
has authority over inferior federal court jurisdiction—is too
entrenched and too relied upon to doubt at this late stage. Indeed,
the historical evidence and textual arguments presented above are
far from conclusive on these matters. Further, the practical
consequences of embracing the constitutional vesting thesis would
be the allowance of all Article III disputes in the federal courts,
regardless of the amount in controversy^ '̂' or the remoteness of the
federal issue;!^^ g^ch breadth could result in the inundation of the
federal courts with too many matters of too little significance.
However, value abounds in the insights gained from our
discussion. Thinking more broadly about the Judicial Power may
enable us to see the Judiciary not as the weakest of the three
branches, but as a truly equal branch that can exercise all of that
power with little congressional interference.
Perhaps accepting the alternative view developed above would
be easier were one to take the traditional, prevailing view of
Judicial Power to its ultimate endpoint. Under the traditional
view. Congress can completely confine inferior federal court
jurisdiction to any limited set of matters as it sees fit. Thus, if
Congress does not like the decisions of the inferior courts
regarding a matter, jurisdiction-stripping legislation is the handy
solution. It is alarming enough that Congress has the ability to
•66 See supra note 89. •
IS' Harrison noted this defect in response to Clinton's view of mandatory vesting of the
Judicial Power in the Federal Judiciary collectively. See Harrison, supra note 124, at 207
("Among the objections to Clinton's thesis is that it would fill the federal courts with
diversity cases.").
168 The "ingredient" theory put forth in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) would permit much broader federal question jurisdiction were the
current limiting interpretations of the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, not in
place.
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impact the Judiciary through its power over procedure, î ^
budgetary starvation, i™ and salary stagnation. I'̂ i The resulting
pijCture of absolute domination by the Legislative Branch that
results from coupling those procedural and fiscal controls with the
power of jurisdiction-stripping just seems too at odds with the plan
of the Convention to be accepted uncritically. That said, the
constitutional vesting thesis offered above only goes so far in
protecting inferior federal courts against congressional
interference; Congress, were it so inclined, could still express its
displeasure by deciding to abolish the inferior federal courts
altogether, although it is highly unlikely that it would ever do
S0,.l''2
I In the end, it is unlikely that the constitutional vesting thesis
propounded herein will be embraced; however, giving some
thought to the possibility of this alternative vision may make
i6p See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts "); Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead,
23 I U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61 (1825) ("Congress might regulate the whole practice of the
Courts, if it was deemed expedient so to do . . . ."). Further reflection might permit me to
question this plenary authority over judicial procedure; however, it is beyond the scope of
this Article to address that issue.
"" See Mark C Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1015, 1023-24 (2006) ("More generally, overall appropriations for the judicial branch
have been a source of conflict and concern between Congress and the federal courts. In
addition to judicial salaries, the federal courts depend upon Congress for funds for new
judgeships, courthouses, staff, technology, and a variety of other purposes. As I have
written previously, 'The annual appropriations process provides a clear avenue to see the
different institutional perspectives of the Supreme Court and of Congress. The courts
rightly see themselves as £in independent third branch, and many judges seem to resent
Congress's interference with their budget requests.' Congress, however, often views the
federal courts as just one more federal agency begging for funds." (footnotes omitted)).
I'lj See id. at 1021 ("Congress has sometimes used judicial salaries to send a clear message
to the courts. For example, in 1964, Congress increased the salaries for lower federal judges
by $7,500 per year but increased the salaries for Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court by only
$4,500 per year 'The $3,000 differential clearly reflected a direct Congressional
reprimand to the Supreme Court.' " (quoting JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS 8 (1972))); id. ("[I]n 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999,
Congress blocked previously announced 'automatic' cost of living increases for various
governmental officials, including federal judges, that had been provided for in the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989.").
i''2, Such a maneuver would have to endure the obstacle of life tenure for incumbent
federal judges as well as confront the utter disarray that would result from a shuttering of
inferior federal courts in the United States of today.
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Congress more circumspect in its manipulation of inferior court
jurisdiction going forward. Furthermore, perhaps this historical
evidence will lead courts and academics to reconsider the long-held
presumption of plenary congressional power over jurisdiction and
show more skepticism towards future efforts to curtail the Judicial
Power of the inferior federal courts.
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